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LAWYERS AND HISTORIANS ARGUE 
ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION 
Jack M. Balkin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The quarrel between lawyers and historians about the proper 
use of history in constitutional law is an old one. It predates the 
rise of conservative originalism in the 1970s and 1980s. For 
example, the term “law office history”—now regularly employed 
to criticize lawyers who engage in historical arguments that are 
opportunistic, anachronistic, and unsophisticated—was employed 
by the legal historian Alfred Kelly in 1965.1 
Kelly’s target was not today’s movement conservatives. He 
criticized the Supreme Court’s practices throughout the 
nineteenth century. 2  Kelly especially objected to the work of 
liberal Justices in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, who, he argued, had 
misused the history of the Founding to overturn older, politically 
conservative precedents. 3  The Justices, Kelly complained, had 
anachronistically invoked history “as a precedent-breaking 
 
 *  Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law 
School. My thanks to Josh Blackman, Jonathan Gienapp, Mark Graber, Steve Griffin, Jill 
Hasday, Sanford Levinson, Reva Siegel, Seth Barrett Tillman, and John Witt for their 
comments on previous drafts. 
 1. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
119, 122, 122 n.13 (“By ‘law-office’ history, I mean the selection of data favorable to the 
position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper 
evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered.”). Kelly was no stranger to the use of 
history in constitutional argument; he had helped the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in 
preparing its historical arguments in Brown v. Board of Education. But he worried that in 
doing so he had become less of a historian and more of an advocate. RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 638–40 (1977). 
Although the expression “law office history” is often associated with Kelly, he was not 
the first to use it. See Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American 
Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 77 (1963) (associating the phrase with 
Howard J. Graham). 
 2. Kelly, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
 3. Id. at 130–32. 
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instrument, by which the Court could purport to return to the 
aboriginal meaning of the Constitution. It was thus able to declare 
that in breaking with precedent it was really maintaining 
constitutional continuity.” 4  What historians object to today—
lawyers sanctimoniously using the authority of the Founding to 
enact their contemporary policy preferences—was not a modern 
innovation, Kelly explained. It had been the Supreme Court’s 
standard operating procedure. 
The quarrel, however, is not simply one between lawyers on 
the one side, and historians on the other. Lawyers (including legal 
academics) are often much more sharply critical of each other’s 
historical arguments than are professional historians.5 Many law 
professors have been trained as historians and some hold 
doctorates in history. Perhaps more important, lawyers may be 
especially sharply critical of how other lawyers use history 
because they are trying to win arguments within law and legal 
theory. (The often heated debates over the meaning of the Second 
Amendment are a prime example.) 6  The adversary culture of 
legal argument encourages portraying opposing arguments as 
incomplete, mistaken, anachronistic, or wrong-headed. So 
lawyers find themselves on all sides of debates about how lawyers 
should (and should not) use history in constitutional 
interpretation. 
Even to speak of “lawyers” as a group neglects the fact that 
there are many kinds of lawyers. Some are judges deciding cases. 
Some are advocates before courts, legislatures, and administrative 
 
 4. Id. at 125. 
 5. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Can The Quill Be Mightier than the Uzi?: History 
“Lite,” “Law Office,” and Worse Meets the Second Amendment, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 663, 
665 (2015) (reviewing MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 
(2014)) (denouncing “the sorry tale of misuse and manipulations” of the history of the 
Second Amendment by legal scholars); William G. Merkel, Heller As Hubris, and How 
McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the Constitutional World as We Know It, 
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2010) (“My own objections to Justice Scalia’s work 
product in Heller focus on the fact that his allegedly history-driven method depends 
fundamentally on numerous false historical claims.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 5; Paul Finkelman, The Living Constitution and the 
Second Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism, and a Very Confused Court, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624 (2015) (“In both Heller and McDonald the Court bases its 
conclusions on a false history that is, for the most part, a fantasy of the majority of the 
Court and opponents of reasonable firearms regulation.”); Nelson Lund, The Second 
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356 (2009) 
(arguing that Justice Scalia pronounced a wide range of gun control regulations 
constitutional with no historical evidence or grounding in original meaning). 
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agencies. Some are legal academics writing learned studies that 
argue for the best interpretation of constitutional provisions. And 
some are legal academics who study history much as professional 
historians do, focusing not on which interpretation of the law is 
correct but on how law and society developed in the way they did. 
The opposition between “lawyers” and “historians” runs 
together two distinctions. The first opposition concerns 
professional training and professional culture. Lawyers are 
educated to be lawyers and have law degrees. They are trained in 
an adversary culture and they are taught to assert and dispute 
claims about legal authority, to enter into and win arguments 
about what the law is or should be. They think about history and 
use history in ways that reflect this adversarial culture of authority 
claiming.7 Historians are trained differently. Their central task is 
not winning legal arguments, or establishing or demolishing legal 
authority. They are interested in the past for many reasons other 
than present-day legal debates.8 They are taught to relish and 
respect ambiguity, the inevitability of multiple interpretations, the 
complexity and multivocality of the past, the fact that the world 
of the past was quite different from the world of the present, and 
that that the concerns and understandings of people living in the 
past were often very different from concerns and understandings 
of people living in the present. 9  This first distinction—in 
 
 7. See Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 513–14 (2008) (noting the advantages of the the distinctively 
adversarial culture of lawyers.); Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 387, 395, 402–05 (2003) (noting that law is an adversarial system that uses 
history to claim authority); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1993) (arguing that law is governed by the “logic of authority” rather than the “logic 
of evidence”) (quoting Frederic W. Maitland, Why the History of English Law Is Not 
Written, in 1 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 480, 491 
(H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911)); id. at 195–96 (“In discovering the past, the historian weighs 
every bit of evidence that comes to hand. The lawyer, by contrast, is after the single 
authority that will settle the case at bar.”). 
 8. See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal 
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 114–15 (1997) (distinguishing “lawyers’ legal 
history” and “historians’ legal history.”) (quoting Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the 
Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1578 (1987) and WILLIAM E. NELSON & JOHN 
PHILLIP REID, THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 185, 235–37, 261–87 
(1985)). 
 9. BERNARD BAILYN, SOMETIMES AN ART: NINE ESSAYS ON HISTORY 22 (2015) 
(“[T]he past is a different world.”); Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures 
of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 942–43 (2015) (arguing that the 
Founders’ world was different in its assumptions, in its conceptual structures, and in how 
it used language, so that one cannot assume “that Founding-era utterances are fairly easy 
to understand because they were spoken and written in English.”). 
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professional training and professional culture—is neither clear-
cut nor universal, because many law professors (and some 
practicing lawyers) have been trained as historians and hold 
history PhD’s. 
The second, and more important, distinction concerns 
rhetorical aims and rhetorical structure. This is not a distinction 
between those people who have law degrees, practice law, sit on 
the bench, or teach in law schools, and those who don’t. It is a 
distinction that concerns how one makes an argument and what 
one is trying to achieve in making that argument. One the one side 
are those I will call “legal advocates”—most but not all of whom 
are trained as lawyers. This group includes judges, lawyers, and 
citizens: anyone who wants to make—or wants to win—an 
argument about the proper legal interpretation of the 
Constitution. On the other side are those I will call “scholar-
historians”—who may include people in or out of the academy, 
including the legal academy. This group includes those who study 
history for reasons other than winning legal arguments or 
establishing the correct interpretation of the law. 
The difference between these groups does not consist in the 
fact that one group makes arguments and the other doesn’t. 
(Historians can be very argumentative when they want to be!) 
The difference is not that one group just focuses on the facts and 
the other has normative values. Historians’ work may be strongly 
normative, in their interpretations, in the presuppositions they 
bring to their work, in their choice of subject matter, or in all 
three. And the difference is not that one group’s work is aimed at 
influencing contemporary politics and public policy and the other 
eschews any ambition for influence or consequences. Historians, 
like legal advocates, may be very much in the world. Their 
histories may reflect present-day concerns. Their choice of subject 
matter, their treatment of that subject matter, and the conclusions 
they draw may be designed to comment critically on the present.10 
Rather, the key difference between the categories of lawyer-
advocates and scholar-historians is that lawyer-advocates make 
arguments that are legally prescriptive as well as normative. Their 
work prescribes the correct interpretation of law. It asserts what 
 
 10. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, The Fight Over the 1619 Project Is Not About the Facts, 
THE ATL. (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/historians-
clash-1619-project/604093/. 
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the law is, or, when the law is unsettled, unclear, or in need of 
reform, what the best interpretation of the law should be. This 
way of arguing does not simply assert what is moral or immoral, 
prudent or imprudent, true or false. Rather, it claims legal 
authority, or it offers facts and arguments to support such claims 
of authority.11 
Lawyers learn to argue for and against legal interpretations, 
to claim legal authority for their positions and to undermine the 
claims of legal authority of those they disagree with. They try to 
reduce uncertainty into certainty, and turn complication into 
persuasive argument. Lawyers believe that their audiences want 
clear cut answers, and so they provide them. 
The tensions between the work of lawyer-advocates and 
scholar-historians are at their greatest precisely when lawyer-
advocates are most adversarial and most prescriptive, when they 
are most determined to establish clear legal authority for their 
arguments and undermine or explode the claims of authority 
made by their opponents.12 Historians have noted this tension 
repeatedly when they write or join amicus briefs in high profile 
cases, for example, concerning abortion and gun rights.13 
In the legal academy, this assertion of legal authority may be 
 
 11. John Phillip Reid, supra note 7, at 196 (“The search for authority, the need to 
find ‘the law’ or ‘the right law’ is the main reason lawyers speak of the legal past in terms 
quite different from the historian’s.”). 
 12. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 144 (noting that the NAACP’s brief in Brown v. Board 
of Education presented “a great deal of perfectly valid constitutional history,” but that “it 
also manipulated history in the best tradition of American advocacy, carefully marshaling 
every possible scrap of evidence in favor of the desired interpretation and just as carefully 
doctoring all the evidence to the contrary, either by suppressing it when that seemed 
plausible, or by distorting it when suppression was not possible”). 
 13. See Joshua Stein, Historians Before the Bench: Friends of the Court, Foes of 
Originalism, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 359, 362–80 (2013) (describing how historians had 
to alter their practices in writing Supreme Court amicus briefs involving the Second 
Amendment, gay rights, and detainees at Guantanamo Bay). 
A famous example is the historians’ brief in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 
492 U.S. 490 (1989), which spawned considerable reflection among legal historians. Brief 
of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, reprinted in 12 THE 
PUBLIC HISTORIAN 37 (1990); see Wendy Chavkin, Webster, Health, and History, 12 PUB. 
HISTORIAN 53 (1990); Estelle B. Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy: 
Rethinking the Webster Amicus Brief, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 27 (1990); Michael Grossberg, 
The Webster Brief: History as Advocacy, or Would You Sign It?, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 45 
(1990); Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger, “That’s Not History”: The Boundaries of 
Advocacy and Scholarship, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 33 (1990); Sylvia A. Law, Conversations 
Between Historians and the Constitution, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 11 (1990); James C. Mohr, 
Historically Based Legal Briefs: Observations of a Participant in the Webster Process, 12 
PUB. HISTORIAN 19 (1990).  
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several steps removed. Legal academics may renounce any 
interest in prescriptive arguments about legal authority. They may 
insist that they are not telling courts how to decide cases. But if 
courts are interested in a particular ground of decision—for 
example, the original meaning of the Constitution—this, and not 
that, is the correct answer to the question.14 In this way, a legal 
academic, disclaiming all normative ambitions, may focus 
intensively on uncovering the original meaning of a particular 
constitutional provision, with the implication that if courts want 
to be faithful to the original meaning, they should see it the same 
way. 
In the quest for authority, lawyers do not merely condense 
and simplify. They also extend legal authority from the past. They 
seek to infer, from an incomplete historical record reflecting a 
different historical context, how the past would bear on present-
day problems. They complete arguments that may have never 
been completed; they draw inferences and apply insights that may 
never have been drawn or applied by people living in the past. 
This act of extension in pursuit of authority is always creative.15 
Because they focus on cases, statutes, and other legal 
materials, professionally trained lawyers may not pay very much 
attention to what professionally trained historians think about the 
topics on which they expound. As Michael Rappaport puts it 
succinctly, “[T]he originalist is not looking for ‘what the past tells 
us about a matter.’ The originalist is looking for the original 
meaning.”16 
 
 14. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1231 (2012) 
(distinguishing between the task of ascertaining original meaning, theories of political 
legitimacy, and theories of adjudication). 
 15. See also Kramer, supra note 7, at 402–08 (noting that lawyers have distinctive 
ways of making arguments, using evidence, imposing burdens of proof, and resolving 
uncertainties that are not shared in other disciplines). As Larry Kramer puts it: 
[I]nsofar as the originalist interpretive method unavoidably involves a creative 
act by the modern interpreter—that of completing an argument that may have 
been unfinished when the Constitution was adopted—this link [between the 
Founders and the present] is just as unavoidably broken. At that point, there is 
literally no difference between what an originalist does and what is done by the 
most anti-historicist non-originalist—except, of course, for the results (each 
approach producing its share of outcomes that adherents of the other approach 
view as bizarre, made up, and unjustifiable). 
Id. at 407; see also id. at 412–13 (“Taking sides in an unresolved historical debate is no 
different from taking sides in an unresolved contemporary one, and doing so severs the 
link to what supposedly gives [an originalist] (or any) historical argument its normative 
legal significance.”). 
 16. Mike Rappaport, An Important Difference Between Historians and Originalist 
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But when historians do criticize them, lawyers may tend to 
react defensively. In a blog post entitled “Challenging the 
priesthood of professional historians,” 17  constitutional scholar 
Randy Barnett argued that historians’ criticisms of originalism 
were often misguided: “some [historians] apparently believe that 
they, and they alone, can recover the meaning of a law enacted in 
the Eighteenth Century when they would not be able to 
understand the meaning of a law enacted in the Twenty-First. 
That’s either hubris or chutzpah.” 18  Reviewing Jack Rakove’s 
Pulitzer Prize-winning book Original Meanings, 19  Saikrishna 
Prakash complained that “Rakove’s primary problem is that he 
approaches the law as a historian. . . . Rakove recounts events in 
the time-honored tradition of the historian less concerned about 
the meaning of legal text and more concerned with ideas.” 20 
Confronted by historians’ critiques, lawyers may argue that 
historians do not understand what they are doing, and emphasize 
that historians and lawyers are engaged in different projects.21 
Lawyers attempt to escape the gaze and condemnation of 
historians through two standard stories that explain the 
differences between what lawyers and historians do. The first is 
the story of legal science—by which I do not mean experimental 
science but an organized body of thought and methods 
characteristic of a learned profession. The second is the story of a 
usable past. Each explanation seeks to turn the tables on 
historians, arguing that they lack something necessary to interpret 
 
Law Professors, LAW & LIBERTY (Oct. 11, 2018), https://old.lawliberty.org/2018/10/11/an-
important-difference-between-historians-and-originalist-law-professors/. 
 17. Randy E. Barnett, Challenging the Priesthood of Professional Historians, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2017, 11:51 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/28/challenging-the-priesthood-of-professional-historians/. 
Barnett responded to a critique of originalism by Stanford historian Jonathan Gienapp. 
Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional Originalism and History, PROCESS: A BLOG FOR AM. 
HIST. (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history/ (“By 
understanding how [originalism] has changed, we can appreciate the unique, little 
understood, and urgent threat it now poses to the practice of history.”). 
 18. Barnett, supra note 17. 
 19. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 20. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. 
COMMENT. 529, 539 (1998). 
 21. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 20, at 539–40 (arguing that historians do not 
understand what originalist lawyers are doing); Barnett, supra note 17; Mike Rappaport, 
Historians and Originalists, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/08/historians-and-
originalistsmike-rappaport.html (same). 
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the Constitution correctly. 
The first story portrays lawyers as experts in legal science—a 
body of knowledge and a rigorous set of methods and practices 
that is known and practiced only by professionally trained lawyers 
with legal degrees. Historians are uneducated laypersons, 
unskilled in the special techniques of legal reasoning—the 
professional knowledge available only to the possessors of the JD 
degree—and ignorant of the artificial reason of the law. “[S]ome 
historians,” Randy Barnett explains, “seem to think they can 
investigate the meaning of legal terms and concepts in the past 
without any legal training. For this it helps to be a lawyer. True, 
some of the best legal historians do have legal training, but not all 
who opine on the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution do.”22 
The second story portrays lawyers as practical people who 
must solve contemporary problems of great importance. Because 
of these worldly and professional obligations, lawyers need a 
useable past.23  “The search for a useable past,” Cass Sunstein 
argues, “is a defining feature of the constitutional lawyer’s 
approach to constitutional history.”24 Lawyers, Alexander Bickel 
explained, “are guided in our search of the past by our own 
aspirations and evolving principles, . . . principles that we can 
adopt or adapt, or ideals and aspirations that speak with 
 
 22. Barnett, supra note 17; see also Rappaport, supra note 21 (arguing that 
“[h]istorians often do not understand or apply [originalism] correctly,” because “historians 
often lack legal training,” are “trained to be skeptical of reaching conclusions that suggest 
a single (or dominant) view at a time,” and because “if one has the skills to be a historian, 
he or she may not have other skills.”); cf. Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal 
Scholarship: The Case Of History-In-Law, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 909, 917 (1996) 
(explaining, with some degree of irony, that “the criteria for determining whether someone 
has done well at the practice of history-in-law may be different from those for determining 
whether someone has done well at the practice of history, and they may be developed and 
applied by lawyers and legal academics rather than historians.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1017, 
1055 (1981) (“Many of the criticisms that historians make of lawyers’ history are indeed 
irrelevant to the lawyer’s task. . . . [Sometimes] they want . . . to make new, mythic, 
traditions out of it to use in current argument.”); Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The 
History Of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 
459, 504–07 (1997) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL 
LIBERALISM (1996)) (noting the argument that lawyers are more interested in myth and 
heritage than in historical niceties); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 601, 604 (1995) (arguing for “identify[ing] those features of the 
constitutional past” that a lawyer views as “especially suitable for present constitutional 
use”); Tushnet, supra note 22, at 924–28 (noting, without specifically endorsing, this 
feature of history-in-law). 
 24. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603. 
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contemporary relevance. . . .”25 But historians, because of their 
own professional norms and obligations, have a different 
approach. So they fail to understand what lawyers need in order 
to do their jobs; and this makes their criticisms unhelpful. In this 
story, historians are antiquarians: academics ensconced in the 
ivory towers of the humanities. Perversely, historians see it as 
their mission to make the past alien, convoluted, complicated, and 
of no practical use to anyone.26 
These two rhetorical strategies push in opposite directions. 
The story of lawyers as legal scientists portrays lawyers as 
gatekeepers of an elite specialized knowledge misunderstood by 
and inaccessible to the general public, while the story of the need 
for a usable past portrays lawyers as practical problem solvers 
who, unlike historians, are very much in the world. But what 
unites the two stories is their emphasis on the distinctive 
professional identity of lawyers. Because (non-JD) historians do 
not face the professional imperatives of lawyers and lack their 
professional training, historians’ objections are either naive or 
misguided. 
Both of these stories are misleading. First, they paint a false 
picture of how the work of historians is relevant to legal argument. 
Second, by emphasizing lawyers’ professional differences from 
historians, they disguise disagreements within the class of lawyers 
and legal advocates about how to use (and how not to use) history. 
When lawyers try to stiff-arm historians, often what they are 
actually doing is engaging in long-running disputes with other 
lawyers who disagree with their interpretive theories, their 
methods, and their conclusions. 
We need a better account of the relationship between legal 
 
 25. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 109–10 (2d ed. 1986). 
 26. See Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L. REV. 
37, 37 (1998) (“History, or at least history written according to the conventions of late 
twentieth century professional historians, with an emphasis on the ways in which the past 
differed from the present—history as an account of the pastness of the past, as the standard 
expression goes—enormously complicates the task of legal argument.”); Gordon, supra 
note 23, at 1055 (“[T]he immediate interest of historians is always in ‘historicizing’ the past 
as much as possible, tamping it down firmly into departed times and places.”); Helen 
Irving, Outsourcing The Law: History and the Disciplinary Limits of Constitutional 
Reasoning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 961 (2015) (“The instrumental use of history is 
entirely at odds with the skeptical discipline required of historians.”); Tushnet, supra note 
22, at 915 (noting the familiar historical tropes of showing the complexity, contradiction, 
foreignness, and strangeness of the past). 
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argument and historical scholarship, an account that shows how 
legal advocates and historians actually join issue in debates about 
the Constitution. 
Fortunately, there is a fairly straightforward way to explain 
what is going on, and it uses a very familiar idea in constitutional 
theory—the modalities of constitutional argument. The 
modalities treat legal reasoning as rhetoric—as a set of common 
topics for argument that shape and structure legal discourse and 
legal imagination. 27  The modalities not only shape how an 
argument is constructed; they also connect the advocate’s 
reasoning to claims of legal authority as naturally as ligaments 
connect muscle to bone. 
Focusing on the modalities of constitutional argument helps 
us understand how legal advocates use history in constitutional 
argument. Modalities mediate and filter the past through 
rhetorical forms. 28 Legal advocates don’t simply invoke history 
when making their arguments. They channel history through the 
standard topics of legal justification. 29  These forms of legal 
justification—for example, appeals to text, structure, and 
precedent—simultaneously explain why their positions claim 
legal authority, and why other people (and especially judges) 
should accept these arguments.30 
The modalities are also the lenses through which lawyers see 
and discover history. Legal advocates—and especially 
 
 27. See Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1881 
(1994) (“[L]egal activity is . . . expressed and acted out through the various modalities of 
legal argument. . . . [T]the modalities are the grammar of the law. . . .”); id. at 1891 (“[W]e 
have the modalities we do because the Anglo-Americans took the forms of argument at 
common law and superimposed these on the state when they imposed a written, limiting 
constitution on the state.”). 
 28. Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145, 189 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Arguing About 
the Constitution]; Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 664–65 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, The New Originalism]. 
 29. The idea that argument is structured in rhetorical topics goes back to Aristotle. 
ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 44–46 (George A. Kennedy 
trans., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC]; Jack M. Balkin, A Night in 
the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAW’S 
STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz 
eds., 1996). The modalities are what Aristotle would have called “special topics” connected 
to a particular discipline or science. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28, 
at 170, 181–82. 
 30. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28, at 185; Balkin, The New 
Originalism, supra note 28, at 664. 
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professionally trained lawyers—view history through the lens of 
shared forms of legal justification. And how legal advocates 
search for, understand, and employ history is shaped, consciously 
or unconsciously, by these same forms of justification.31 
In short, if we want to understand the disputes between 
lawyers and historians, or between legal advocates and scholar-
historians, there is no better place to look than the structure of 
legal rhetoric, because the structure of legal rhetoric reflects the 
structure of legal reasoning. 
Once we examine the quarrel between lawyers and historians 
through the lens of the modalities, many issues become clear—
why self-confident lawyers ignore historians or find them 
irrelevant, why they nevertheless cannot escape the critical gaze 
of historians, and why they cannot do without historians’ history, 
however much they may abuse or mangle it. 
Part II of this article explains how legal advocates use 
standard forms of argument to think and talk about history. The 
way they look at and use history depends on the modalities they 
employ. Part III explains that in using the modalities, legal 
advocates invoke history in four different registers: constructively 
and deconstructively, obediently and critically. Part IV shows how 
historians interact with these rhetorical structures. It argues that 
with respect to most of them, historians are as well-equipped if 
not better equipped than lawyers. The article then takes up the 
two standard ways that lawyers try to hold off criticisms from 
historians. Part V discusses the claim that lawyers have a special 
professionalized knowledge unavailable to non-legally trained 
historians. Part VI discusses the claim that lawyers need a useable 
past. Part VII concludes by arguing that the model of multiple 
modalities provides the best way to make the past useable, 
because it acknowledges the many different uses of history. 
II. THE MODALITIES AND HISTORICAL ARGUMENT 
Lawyers use a standard set of forms of argument to analyze 
constitutional problems and construct arguments about the best 
interpretation of the Constitution. Philip Bobbitt famously called 
these standard forms of argument “modalities,”32 and his basic 
 
 31. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 668–72 (showing how a focus on 
text, tradition, and precedent look at the same history in different ways). 
 32. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter 
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account has become widely accepted in constitutional theory. 
It turns out, however, that Bobbitt’s original list of standard 
arguments is not very useful for thinking about how lawyers use 
history in constitutional argument. First, he confusingly called one 
of his modalities “historical” argument.33 That seemed to imply 
that there was a single historical modality, and that all the other 
kinds of arguments—from text, precedent, consequences, 
structure, and national ethos—did not use history. (Bobbitt 
himself did not believe this.) Second, even more confusingly, 
Bobbitt identified “historical” arguments with arguments from 
original intention.34 This seemed to imply that the only ways that 
lawyers used history in constitutional law was by making 
originalist arguments. It also seemed to suggest that all originalist 
arguments were arguments from original intention, which has not 
been true since at least the 1980s, when arguments from original 
public meaning became the dominant approach. 
Some time back, building on the work of Bobbitt and 
Richard Fallon, I proposed a different list of standard 
constitutional arguments, better calibrated to the kinds of 
arguments that lawyers make, and better designed to explain the 
uses of history in constitutional argument.35 
Most arguments about the proper interpretation of 
Constitution fall into the following basic categories:36 
 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE]. 
 33. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 32, at 9; BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 32, at 13. 
 34. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 32, at 9 (defining “[h]istorical 
arguments” as those which “depend on a determination of the original understanding of 
the constitutional provision to be construed”); BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 32, at 13 (“A[] historical modality may be attributed to 
constitutional arguments that claim that the framers and ratifiers [of a constitutional 
provision] intended, or did not intend. . . .”); id. (“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to 
construing the text . . . are distinctive in their reference back to what a particular provision 
is thought to have meant to its ratifiers.”). Similarly, Richard Fallon’s list of constitutional 
arguments refers to “[a]rguments of historical intent,” which he identified with “the intent 
of the framers.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244, 1254 (1987). Both Bobbitt 
and Fallon wrote at a time when the focus of originalist theory was shifting from original 
intention and understanding to original meaning. 
 35. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28, at 183–84; Balkin, The 
New Originalism, supra note 28, at 660. 
 36. This list is taken from Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28, at 
183–84; and Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 660. 
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1. Arguments from text. These include arguments about defini-
tions of the words and phrases in the text; arguments that com-
pare and contrast different parts of the text; arguments that 
compare the text with other texts; arguments that look to dic-
tionaries and corpus linguistics; and arguments that employ tra-
ditional canons of statutory interpretation. 
2. Arguments about constitutional structure. These are arguments 
about how the constitutional system as a whole should operate 
and how the various parts of the system should interact with 
each other. These include arguments about the proper function-
ing of federalism, the separation of powers, democracy, and re-
publican government. 
3. Arguments from constitutional purpose. These are arguments 
about the point or purpose of the Constitution. They include ar-
guments about the purposes, intentions, and expectations of the 
people who lived at the time of the adoption of the Constitution 
and its subsequent amendments, as well as purposes attributed 
to the Constitution over time. 
4. Arguments from consequences. These are arguments about the 
likely consequences of interpreting the Constitution in one way 
rather than another. Arguments from consequences include ar-
guments of institutional prudence: arguments that consider the 
political and practical consequences of a proposed interpreta-
tion (or implementing doctrine), the likely responses of other 
institutions or persons if the interpretation were accepted, and 
how well or how badly other actors will be likely to administer 
the interpretation in the future. 
5. Arguments from judicial precedent. These are arguments based 
on previous judicial decisions, whether from the United States 
or from pre-1789 Great Britain. They include arguments about 
what is holding and what is dicta, about what is controlling au-
thority and what is merely persuasive authority. They include 
familiar common law arguments for distinguishing cases, gener-
alizing from cases, reasoning from case to case, and reasoning 
by analogy. Arguments from precedent include arguments 
based on the doctrinal categories and tests that previous prece-
dents have generated. Hence, arguments from judicial prece-
dent collectively form a very large family of topics and subtop-
ics. They are probably the most common form of legal 
arguments about the Constitution. 
6. Arguments from political convention. These are arguments 
about political conventions and settlements that arise within in-
stitutions or branches of government (for example, within the 
Executive Branch); or among institutions or branches of 
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government (for example, conventions that arise between the 
Executive Branch and Congress). 
7. Arguments from the people’s customs and lived experience. 
These arguments consider the public’s customs, expectations, 
and ways of life and whether a proposed interpretation of the 
Constitution will conform to, vindicate, assist, defy, or disrupt 
them. 
8. Arguments from natural law or natural rights. These arguments 
concern rights that governments exist to secure and protect 
(natural rights); as well as arguments about what kinds of laws 
are necessary to protect and promote human flourishing (natu-
ral law). 
9. Arguments from national ethos. Arguments from ethos appeal 
to the character of the nation and its institutions, and to im-
portant, widely shared and widely honored values of Americans 
and American culture. 
10. Arguments from political tradition. Arguments from political 
tradition appeal to the traditions and traditional values of the 
American people, to cultural memory, to the meaning of key 
events in American political history (e.g., the Revolution, the 
Civil War, the New Deal), and to the lessons we should draw 
from those events. They often overlap with arguments about na-
tional ethos. 
11. Arguments from honored authority. Arguments from honored 
authority appeal to the values, beliefs, and examples of culture 
heroes in American life. Examples of culture heroes include the 
Founders as a group and key Founders like George Washington 
and James Madison; or important historical figures like Abra-
ham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, Susan B. Anthony, and Mar-
tin Luther King. They often overlap with arguments about na-
tional ethos and political tradition. 
These categories are not exhaustive, but they cover most 
examples. All of the categories overlap to some degree, but the 
last three are very closely related, so I will sometimes refer to 
them collectively as arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored 
authority. 
Looking at this list, we can immediately draw several 
conclusions about the use of history in constitutional argument. 
First, people use history to support arguments from each of 
these modalities. Even arguments from judicial precedent often 
look to history. 37  The application of doctrinal categories may 
 
 37. For an excellent account of how lawyers use history in precedental argument, see 
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require historical inquiries. For example, the test for a suspect 
classification under the Equal Protection Clause depends on 
showing a history of previous discrimination.38 That means that 
there is no single modality of “historical argument.” Rather 
arguments using all of the modalities may invoke history to 
support their claims. 
Second, how one uses history will differ depending on the 
modality of argument one uses. For example, textual arguments 
might look to dictionaries and corpus linguistics because they 
focus on the meaning of the words of the text; arguments from 
precedent might look to English legal history because they look 
for the history of legal understandings; arguments from custom 
might look to social histories; arguments from consequences 
might look to experiences in the American colonies, the states and 
other countries because they want to know how different choices 
produce different effects; arguments from honored authority 
might look to George Washington’s behavior in his first 
Administration, or Frederick Douglass’s views on public schools, 
and so on. For each modality of constitutional argument, there 
will be a different way to use history. 
Third, the kind of history one looks for depends on the 
relevant modality of argument. The kind of argument one is 
making—about linguistic meaning, legal practices, social custom, 
predictable consequences—may make different historical sources 
relevant. But even the same historical sources and events might 
be used differently depending on the modality. Thus, different 
aspects of the history of Reconstruction might support arguments 
from text, structure, consequences, political tradition, or honored 
authority. 
Fourth, what we call “originalist” arguments are only a small 
proportion of the many different kinds of legal arguments that use 
history. The modalities are not confined to adoption history. They 
can look to the history of many different times and places.39 They 
 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753 (2015). 
 38. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) 
(plurality opinion). 
 39. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 666–68 (giving the example of 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 641 (1952), which makes a structural argument about executive power by drawing 
comparisons to pre-World War II France, Great Britain, and Germany). 
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can range across the whole of human activity. They need not be 
confined to the views of Founders or adopters. And they can focus 
on people who were excluded from or ignored in constitutional 
debates.40 
Fifth, even if we restrict ourselves to originalist arguments or 
arguments from adoption history, there is not a single kind of 
originalist argument. Arguments that look to Founding-era 
dictionaries and corpus linguistics use history differently than 
arguments about constitutional structure taken from the state 
ratification debates; arguments about political conventions taken 
from Washington’s First Administration; and arguments about 
the legal meaning of the Constitution drawn from the English Bill 
of Rights or the relative powers of Parliament and the King 
following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 
Sixth, and conversely, not all arguments about adoption 
history count as originalist. Consider arguments for departing 
from original legal understandings because those understandings 
bear the taint of racism or sexism. These arguments use adoption 
history, but not in the way that originalist legal scholars generally 
do. (I return to this point when I discuss the distinction between 
obedient and critical uses of history.) 
Seventh, and finally, modalities of legal argument are 
centrally about how to claim legal authority. Each modality offers 
a different way to claim authority for a proposed legal 
interpretation. That is because each modality rests upon 
commonplaces about how to interpret the Constitution. Each 
offers an implicit theory for why arguments of a certain kind 
should be accepted as valid or as persuasive when people interpret 
the Constitution, and why such arguments further the 
Constitution and are faithful to the Constitution. When people 
use history to make arguments from each modality, they are using 
history to claim legal authority. They assert that the facts of 
history have consequences for whose interpretation has legal 
 
 40. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, REVOLUTIONARY BACKLASH, WOMEN AND POLITICS 
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2007); Christina Mulligan, Diverse Originalism, 21 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 379 (2018); Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the 
Democratic Reconstruction of the Family, 129 YALE L.J.F. 450 (2020), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Siegel_TheNineteenthAmendmentandtheDemocrati
zationoftheFamily_kwjdphtp.pdf; see also GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE 
PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S at 60–71 (2019) (discussing the views of “constitutional 
outsiders”). 
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authority and whose does not. This is what makes legal uses of 
history distinctive. 
III. CONSTRUCTIVE AND DECONSTRUCTIVE, 
OBEDIENT AND CRITICAL USES OF HISTORY 
The culture of legal argument is an adversarial culture. Legal 
advocates try to establish their own claims of legal authority, and 
they also try to undermine claims of legal authority by their 
opponents. This suggests two different rhetorical postures—one 
that promotes certainty and one that promotes uncertainty. 
Authority-constructing uses of history employ history to construct 
claims of legal authority using the various modalities. They 
marshal historical facts and organize historical studies to build a 
convincing case and ward off potential objections. Authority-
deconstructing uses of history use history to rebut, cast doubt on, 
or complicate other people’s uses of history as they employ the 
modalities. The goal of authority-deconstructing arguments are 
not to build up, but to tear down—to shift burdens of proof, to 
sow uncertainty, to deny clarity, to multiply complexity, and to 
assert that one’s opponent’s arguments gloss over important facts, 
indulge in anachronisms, or are overly simplistic. 
In addition, when advocates use the modalities, there are two 
different ways to invoke the past as authority for law. The first 
approach treats the past as a positive source of authority, as 
something we should follow in the present. The second treats the 
past as something we should avoid or transcend, or whose 
unfortunate legacy we still suffer from.41 
 
 41. See ROBERT W. GORDON, The Past as Authority and Social Critic: Stabilizing and 
Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument, in TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON 
LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW 282–316 (2017) (describing lawyers’ opposing 
uses of history); Robert W. Gordon, The Struggle Over the Past, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123, 
125 (1996) (“The critical modes [of historical argument] are used to destroy, or anyway to 
question, the authority of the past.”); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-viewing 
History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE 
L.J. 237, 238 (1998) (“Abandoned past practices can be used to argue, through a process 
of negative inference, against analogous modern practices. Equally important, negative 
precedent acknowledges the injuries caused by past practices that now seem 
unacceptable.”); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: 
The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 296, 300 (2003) (“Aversive constitutionalism . . . is backward-looking, 
proceeding from a critique of where past (or other) institutions and principles went badly 
wrong and taking such critiques as the negative building blocks of a new constitutional 
order.”). 
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Obedient uses of history treat the past as a positive model for 
present-day behavior, because it reveals correct meanings, 
because it serves as honored precedent, because it is morally 
worthy, because it offers a positive example of what to do, because 
it tutors us how to behave, or because it is consistent with political 
traditions. Critical uses of history treat the past as something that 
we should not follow in the present and should reject, compensate 
for, or disown. Critical history is aversive history. It describes 
faults, sins, and errors. It shows us what we should never let 
happen again, what should no longer be part of us, and what we 
should strive to repair. Critical history may also show us the legacy 
of mistake, injustice, and oppression that we should react against, 
that we should try to extirpate, compensate for, eliminate, or 
disestablish in our current practices. 
Of course, the past is neither uniformly one thing or another. 
Good and bad, honorable and dishonorable, helpful and harmful, 
are all mixed together, and what we see in the past reflects our 
current situation and perspectives. The meaning of the past 
continually changes, not because the facts change, but because we 
change, pushed forward continuously into new situations, which 
form ever new perspectives and points of comparison with the old, 
and which cast a continuously changing light and shadow on what 
went before. Historical studies rightly emphasize the motley 
nature of the past, its richness and its ambiguity, as well as its 
difference from our current world. In distinguishing between 
obedient and critical uses of history, I am not claiming that the 
moral meaning of history is clear-cut. Instead, I am interested in 
how the past is used in legal rhetoric, as a positive model or a 
negative precedent. 
Combining these rhetorical postures, we have a box of four: 
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TABLE 1: RHETORICAL POSTURES IN USING HISTORY 
 
Authority-constructing 
(using the modalities) 
 
Authority-deconstructing 
(directed against opponents’ 
use of the modalities) 
 
Obedient Claiming legal 
authority from positive 
example or precedent 
 
Example: “Alexander 
Hamilton’s views in 
The Federalist are a 
sure guide to the 
powers of the 
Presidency today.” 
Undermining claims to legal 
authority from positive 
example or precedent 
 
Example: “There is 
insufficient evidence that 
the Founding generation 
believed that the Second 
Amendment guaranteed an 
individual right to bear arms 
outside of military service.” 
Critical Claiming legal 
authority through 





laws are a continuation 
of the legacy of Jim 
Crow-era poll taxes.” 
Undermining claims to legal 
authority that draw use 
aversive history or negative 
examples 
 
Example: “It is a gross 
oversimplification to 
conclude that state bans on 
government aid to religion 
stem from anti-Catholic 
bigotry.” 
 
In practice, a skillful advocate will use all four of these 
approaches in framing a legal argument, offering positive 
precedents to be followed and negative historical examples to 
disown, while simultaneously highlighting mistakes, confusions, 
complexities, and anachronisms in opponents’ arguments. 
Advocates will pick the part of the past they want to honor, while 
disclaiming or glossing over other parts of the past. Their 
opponents, eager to rebut them, will try to flip the script, seizing 
on omissions and complications. 
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IV. HISTORIANS MEET THE MODALITIES 
How do scholar-historians fit into the rhetorical structures 
I’ve just described? This assumes, of course, that they want to 
participate. They might resist being drawn into forms of rhetoric 
at cross-purposes with their scholarly enterprise. 42  But many 
historians now author amicus briefs, 43  and serve as expert 
witnesses in constitutional controversies. 44  So we can ask how 
they might intervene in lawyers’ forms of argument. 
First, historians can use the standard forms of constitutional 
argument just as well as lawyers can. They can also make 
arguments from text, structure, purpose, consequences, custom, 
convention, tradition, ethos, honored authority, and so on. Most 
of the standard modalities of constitutional argument do not 
require any special professional training. A central motivation 
behind Bobbitt’s original model of modalities, after all, was that 
lawyers and ordinary citizens alike could practice constitutional 
interpretation.45 The modality of argument that seems to benefit 
most from specialized legal training is precedental argument: the 
ability to employ and manipulate legal precedents—for example, 
creating narrow and broad versions, distinguishing and 
connecting bodies of case law, and developing new doctrinal 
 
 42. See Stein, supra note 13, at 362–70 (describing how historians had to alter their 
practices in writing Supreme Court amicus briefs involving the Second Amendment); 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Linda Gordon & Kenneth Mack, Historians in Court: A 
Roundtable, OAH, https://www.oah.org/tah/issues/2017/november/historians-in-court-a-
roundtable/ (discussing the differences between legal advocacy and historical inquiry); see 
also sources cited supra note 13 (discussing the choices historians had to make in the 
Webster amicus brief to explain to courts why Roe v. Wade was correctly decided). 
 43. See, e.g., Nell Gluckman, Why More Historians Are Embracing the Amicus Brief, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 3, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/why-more-
historians-are-embracing-the-amicus-brief/ (“Historians say they feel that they are being 
asked to write or sign amicus briefs in Supreme Court cases more frequently.”); Michael 
Grossberg, Friends of the Court: A New Role For Historians, PERSPS. ON HIST. (Nov. 1, 
2010), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history
/november-2010/friends-of-the-court-a-new-role-for-historians (“[H]istorians are carving 
out a crucial new role for themselves as direct contributors to debates about contested 
legal issues such as same-sex marriage.”).  
 44. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Martin, Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert 
Historical Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1519 (2003) (“Historians 
are increasingly being called to testify as expert witnesses. They appear in cases 
adjudicating a vast array of matters. . . .”); Kritika Agarwal, Historians as Expert Witnesses, 
PERSPS. ON HIST. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories
/perspectives-on-history/february-2017/historians-as-expert-witnesses-can-scholars-help-
save-the-voting-rights-act (“Historians’ testimony has had significant impact in voting 
rights cases.”). 
 45. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 32, at 28–30. 
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distinctions.46 The ability to cite and employ canons of statutory 
construction might be a second, related skill. However, the 
majority of historical inquiry in law does not depend on these 
special skills. (And, of course, historians who are also lawyers 
have received this training.) 
Second, with respect to some of the modalities of legal 
argument—arguments from custom, tradition, ethos, and 
honored authority, or arguments from consequences that depend 
on historical evidence and historical examples—we might expect 
that historians would be better than non-historian lawyers in using 
and deploying historical sources. That is especially the case for 
those periods of history and those parts of the world with which 
most lawyers are unfamiliar. But it is equally true of periods of 
intense lawyerly concern, such as the history of Great Britain in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Founding, the Civil 
War and Reconstruction. Historians may also be far more 
competent at the history of political and social movements (both 
successful and unsuccessful) that have shaped the American 
political tradition. 
Third, as noted above, lawyers use history both to construct 
authority and to undermine and poke holes in other lawyers’ uses 
of history. They use history both constructively and 
deconstructively. Historians can certainly marshal the kinds of 
evidence needed to support the standard forms of legal argument, 
perhaps better than many lawyers can. But historians can also 
offer the kinds of counter-evidence, counter-narratives, and 
complications that are useful in rebutting these arguments. In fact, 
historians are likely to be even better at these tasks than most 
lawyers. 47  After all, historians are professionally rewarded for 
discovering new forms of counter-evidence, offering interesting 
counter-narratives, and noting historical complications. They are 
rewarded for undermining previous historians’ takes and 
producing ever new perspectives on the past. 
Fourth, in constitutional law, lawyers not only disagree about 
 
 46. See Annette Gordon-Reed, Uncovering the Past: Lessons from Doing Legal 
History, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 855, 858–59 (2006–07) (arguing that lawyers are often 
better equipped than non-legally trained historians to think imaginatively about how 
historical figures would handle hypothetical problems given the legal materials of their 
day). 
 47. See Stein, supra note 13, at 380 (“Historians can make their advocacy more 
effective—and more in line with their professional methodology—by using alternative 
(rather than definitive) versions of the past to destabilize originalist argumentation.”). 
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history; they also disagree about theories of legal interpretation—
including the many varieties of originalism. Legal dispute occurs 
both at the level of historical inquiry and at the level of the 
interpretive theories that connect history to legal norms. Lawyers 
are hardly agreed on a single set of interpretive theories, and 
judges may switch their theoretical assumptions from case to case. 
Because lawyers disagree about theory as much as about 
history, historians might play yet another role in legal disputes. 
They can offer examples from history (and from historiography) 
to critique the plausibility or practicality of some of these 
interpretive theories. They can explain why certain kinds of 
interpretive theories are anachronistic, or unlikely to be 
successful on their own terms. 48  They can offer reasons and 
evidence to show why certain theories of legal interpretation ask 
questions of history that the historical record cannot reliably 
answer. 49  They can show that certain historical sources that 
lawyers rely on have a different meaning or importance than 
lawyers think they do, or are not as reliable as lawyers imagine 
them to be.50 Here again, historians are as likely to be as good as 
(or better than) lawyers at this particular critical task. 
Posing the issues in this way has a certain partiality: It asks 
whether historians can play effectively on lawyers’ turf. Historians 
might well wonder why this is the proper inquiry. After all, the 
 
 48. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 721, 724, 734–38 (2013) (criticizing original public meaning originalism for 
abstracting away from the complexities of language during the Founding era and 
projecting contemporary understandings onto the past in the form of an imagined 
reasonable person); Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past: More Qualms About Public 
Meaning Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 975 (2015) (criticizing original public 
meaning originalism for neglecting “the linguistic ideas that were dominant in eighteenth-
century America”). 
 49. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 1, at 156–57 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s inquiry 
into history in the Establishment Clause “asks questions of the past that the past cannot 
answer”); Reid, supra note 7, at 202 (noting that “judges often read the records of the past 
as if they were prepared similarly to the legislative history of today’s congresses, by 
professional staffs anticipating issues likely to arise in litigation . . . [and] ask the past to 
answer questions about matters that were not thought of at the time”). 
 50. See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015) (showing how James Madison revised his notes of 
the Constitutional Convention over many years, often for political reasons); Saul Cornell, 
Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 
OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 632–36 (2008) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller 
misunderstood how preambles were used at the Founding and failed to cite any Founding-
era sources for his claims). 
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door between the two professions swings both ways. Certainly one 
could ask with equal merit whether lawyers can do the kind of 
archival research, ask the kinds of research questions, and offer 
the kinds of answers and analyses that professional historians 
would regard as competent. 51  Indeed, lawyers, who are often 
dogged investigators of facts, may be able to shed light on the 
historical record and correct the views of historians.52 Nothing in 
what I say here denies the importance of these questions—or for 
that matter, the equal status and equal worth of the professional 
perspectives of lawyers and historians. But the focus of this article 
is the uses of history in constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional argument. That interpretation and those arguments 
are structured in the special topics of constitutional law. 
Therefore I ask whether there is something special about the 
modalities of legal argument that justifies lawyers discounting the 
contributions of historians. The answer is no. 
Viewed from the perspective of the modalities, it is easy to 
understand how historians join issue with lawyers on the legal 
interpretation of the Constitution. Professional differences aside, 
the topics of legal argument are common topics for all—not just 
lawyers and judges—that facilitate a common conversation. 
  
 
 51. Kramer, supra note 7, at 389–94 (pointing out the effort required to become even 
minimally competent in understanding the thought of a given historical period). 
 52. For example, in litigation over the Foreign Emoluments Clause, Seth Barrett 
Tillman was able to show that a key document listing the officers under the United States 
(but not including the President) had been prepared and signed by Alexander Hamilton 
in 1793. He also showed that another document said to contradict this account was not 
signed by Hamilton and was actually a copy prepared many years later. See Adam Liptak, 
‘Lonely Scholar with Unusual Ideas’ Defends Trump, Igniting Legal Storm, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/politics/trump-emoluments-
clause-alexander-hamilton.html. The legal historians who accused Tillman of failing to cite 
the second document subsequently agreed with him and apologized. Id. 
Perhaps the most famous example of lawyers correcting the work of legal historians 
is James Lindgren’s efforts in exposing the errors and falsehoods in the work of historian 
Michael Bellesiles. See James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the 
Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195 (2002) (book review). Bellesiles had won the 
prestigious Brancroft Prize for his 2000 book ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A 
NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (2000), which argued that, at the time of the Founding, most 
Americans did not own guns. Following the work of Lindgren, amateur historian Clayton 
Cramer, and other scholars and historians, Columbia University revoked the prize. Robert 
F. Worth, Prize for Book Is Taken Back from Historian, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/14/business/prize-for-book-is-taken-back-from-
historian.html.  
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V. THE SPECIAL SKILL AND  
KNOWLEDGE OF LAWYERS 
Perhaps the most common way that lawyers try to deflect 
criticism from historians is to assert that historians are ignorant of 
the specialized craft of lawyerly reasoning. Professionally trained 
lawyers possess special techniques—known only to the 
professionally educated and accredited—that allow them to 
discern the legal meaning and the legal consequences of texts. 
Because non-legally trained historians do not understand these 
techniques, their criticisms of lawyers’ use of history are likely to 
miss the mark. In our day, this kind of complaint is most likely to 
come from conservative originalists, who often find themselves 
beset by historians who claim that originalist uses of history are 
narrow, parochial and anachronistic. 
Michael Rappaport offers a good example of this strategy. 
He argues that historians do not understand “the enterprise of 
interpretation as practiced by originalists.” 53  “[T]he original 
public meaning approach asks what the meaning of a provision 
would have been to a reasonable and knowledgeable person at 
the time. Historians often do not understand or apply this 
correctly.”54 Because of this misunderstanding, “they often make 
statements that originalists would strongly disagree with, without 
any strong reasons backing them up—statements such as, because 
there was disagreement at the time of the Constitution on a 
provision, that means there was no original meaning.”55 Because 
historians do not accede to or correctly apply originalist theories 
of interpretation, their historical objections are irrelevant. 
Rappaport has dubbed these irrelevant objections “history office 
law,” a play on “law office history.”56 
 
 53. Rappaport, supra note 21. 
 54. Id.; see also Prakash, supra note 20, at 539–40 (“Rakove’s primary problem is that 
he approaches the law as a historian. Although Rakove appears to understand that what 
matters is the original meaning of legal text, his historian’s bent predominates. Rakove 
recounts events in the time-honored tradition of the historian less concerned about the 
meaning of legal text and more concerned with ideas.”). 
 55. Rappaport, supra note 21; see Prakash, supra note 20, at 535 (“Originalism simply 
does not rest on a theory of definite meanings; it only requires an ability to determine 
which of several possible meanings better reflects the most natural reading of the word or 
phrase when the text was ratified.”). 
 56. Rappaport, supra note 21; see Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No 
Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1551, 1559 (2012) (“‘[H]istory department law’ is a much greater threat to sound 
constitutional interpretation than is ‘law office history.’”); Prakash, supra note 20, at 534, 
541 (criticizing “history department law”). 
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What Rappaport sees as misunderstanding or an inability to 
use legal sources properly, however could equally be described as 
a theoretical disagreement about the best way to interpret the 
Constitution. Rappaport’s objection does not actually turn on 
whether historians possess or lack legal training. Rather, his 
argument depends on the assumption that historians should 
accept his theory of the Constitution’s “original public meaning.”  
“Original public meaning” is a theoretical construction, a 
mediated account of the past that serves the purposes of law and 
legal theory. This theory of interpretation selects certain features 
of the past as relevant to legal inquiry, and discards the rest. It 
takes those features of the past that it deems relevant and 
reconfigures them for purposes of a particular theory of law. 
Then, having selected and reconfigured the past, it dubs the result 
the “original public meaning” and declares it binding on 
everyone.57 
Lawyers—including originalist lawyers—do not assume that 
the past comes to us in the form of unambiguous and easily 
intelligible commands; often it does not. Rather, originalist theory 
treats the past as it does because of its theoretical commitments 
and the practical needs of the present.58 History looks the way it 
does to originalist theory because of what originalism needs the 
past to be in order for it to serve the requirements of present-day 
law.59 Originalism seeks to obey the past, but it can only do so if it 
reconfigures the past so that it can be followed. Originalism is a 
servant that needs a particular kind of master, and therefore goes 
about constructing one. The past that emerges from originalist 
inquiry is not simply a description of past events. It is an 
understanding refracted through theoretical choices, some of 
which may be plausible to other lawyers, and some of which may 
 
 57. I explain these claims more fully in Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original 
Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71 (2016). 
 58. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 7, at 405 (“Legal interpretation is fundamentally 
about resolving ambiguities and uncertainties in language: about determining and bringing 
to closure that which is undetermined and open.”); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules For 
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 669 (1987) (“The originalist’s use of history is goal-
directed: he wants to understand past thought and action in order to address present 
concerns.”); Prakash, supra note 20, at 535 (arguing that the point of originalist 
methodology is to do the best we can in order to solve current legal problems). 
 59. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 56, at 1554 (arguing that an originalism “in which 
meaning is determined by the hypothetical understandings of a fictitious reasonable 
observer, rather than those of any concrete historical figures” can solve practical problems 
of adjudication). 
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be highly controversial. 
Originalist theories are hardly unique in this respect. Rather, 
they exemplify how law and legal theory usually employ history. 
They do not simply report what happened at a special moment in 
time. Rather, they construct events—drawing together 
occurrences in disparate locations, and collapsing and telescoping 
time frames—to draw conclusions about meanings and purposes. 
The “Founding,” for example, is not a magical moment in time. It 
occurs in many different places, over several decades. But 
originalist theories tend to treat the Founding as a unified event 
producing meanings that are intelligible and tractable. 
Originalist theories select elements from the historical 
record, leaving much of the messy details of history on the cutting 
room floor. They reorganize and reconfigure the record of the 
past to produce the kind of knowledge that might be useful to the 
legal enterprise. They make the past useful to lawyers so that 
lawyers can employ it for present-day purposes. They beat the 
past into a shape that can serve present-day objects.60 
Once again, we should not see this as a particular problem of 
originalism. All legal theories reconfigure history to theory in 
varying degrees. All legal theories beat the past into shape, they 
simply do it in different ways and for different ends. Theoretical 
commitments tell lawyers what facts are relevant and important 
and why they are relevant and important. These commitments 
shape what lawyers look for in the past and what they find there; 
what they obsessively focus on and what they casually discard. 
A theory of original public meaning—and there are several 
competing accounts—carefully constructs the past so that it can 
serve the needs and values of the present. However, there is 
nothing wrong with this as long as (1) people are candid about the 
nature of the enterprise; (2) they do not pretend that they are 
simply reporting facts free from theoretical framing and 
reconfiguration; and (3) they are candid about the values that 
their interpretive theory serves and are willing to defend those 
values openly. 
 
 60. For a forthright defense of the practice, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 80 (2006) (“Lawyers create 
the object of interpretation, so it is not surprising that lawyers might play a key role in 
understanding it.”); see also Kramer, supra note 7, at 407 (pointing out that both 
originalists and non-originalists are engaged in creative extensions of historical materials). 
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Thus, the dispute is not over whether historians understand 
or misunderstand constitutional interpretation or constitutional 
law. Rather, it is a dispute is over whether a particular theoretical 
construction—offered by a lawyer, judge or legal scholar—is a 
good way to approach constitutional interpretation, or whether it 
is too artificial, too limited, or too blinkered. 
Most historians probably don’t accept Rappaport’s views 
about the best way to interpret the Constitution. But most well-
trained lawyers in the United States probably don’t accept this 
theory either. Not all lawyers are originalists, and even among 
originalists, there are important theoretical disagreements about 
what original meaning is, how it is best demonstrated, and what 
legal force it should have.61 Lawyers might make some of the same 
objections that historians would. That is hardly surprising; lawyers 
on either side of a controversy reach out for support from other 
disciplines all the time. 
In short, the problem is not that historians do not understand 
the enterprise of originalist interpretation. It is that they do not 
agree with the underlying theory, and many other lawyers would 
agree with them. 62  Instead of a dispute between untutored 
historians and knowledgeable lawyers, we also have an intermural 
scrum among lawyers. Instead of a dispute between “law” and 
“history,” we actually have a dispute within legal theory itself. It 
is a dispute over how law should select from, filter, and 
reconfigure the past so that law can use it for legal purposes.63 
With respect to that task, historians have something to say, not 
because they are experts in legal theory, but because they know 
 
 61. For examples of criticisms of Rappaport’s theory from non-originalists, see 
Frederic Bloom & Nelson Tebbe, Countersupermajoritarianism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 809 
(2015); John W. Compton, What Is Originalism Good For?, 50 TULSA L. REV. 427 (2015); 
Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or 
Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283 (2014); James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the 
Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 515 (2014); Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive 
Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459 (2016). For examples of criticisms from originalists, see Kurt 
T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149 (2015); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 503–11 
(2013). 
 62. The number of critiques of originalism by lawyers and law professors is seemingly 
endless. For a recent example of the genre, see ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 
(2018). 
 63. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 503 (“The use of history in law, after all, is at 
bottom a question of legal theory, and just as this method of constitutional interpretation 
(originalism) is demonstrably flawed as a matter of practice, so it may also be a weak 
candidate as a matter of theory.”). 
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something about what kinds of theoretical projects the historical 
record can plausibly support. 
If lawyers would disagree with Rappaport about these 
matters, it is not clear that similar objections by historians may be 
dismissed as irrelevant. Put another way, it does not matter who 
raises the objection, as long as the objection is an appropriate one 
in the context of the forms of legal argument.64 
To be sure, given their professional outlook and training, 
historians may have particular reasons for objecting to a given 
theory of original meaning. Jack Rakove, for example, has 
strongly criticized the notion that we should equate original 
meaning with the hypothetical reasonable and informed person at 
the time of adoption. He points out that this is simply not a 
credible way to do history.65 Inquiries into original meaning, he 
believes, should be based on sound practices of historical 
research, otherwise the account of original public meaning will be 
anachronistic, and “nothing more nor less than a creature of the 
modern originalist jurist’s imagination.”66 
Rakove’s objections, however informed by his professional 
training, would also be perfectly sensible for any lawyer to make 
in rebutting arguments from text, structure, or purpose.67 It is 
always appropriate to point out that one’s opponent employs an 
implausible methodology, that her arguments misuse historical 
sources, that her theory of original meaning is question begging, 
or that her inferences about historical meaning are naive or 
anachronistic. It should not matter that these objections come 
from the mouth of a professionally trained historian, who, if 
anything, has even greater credibility in making them. 
 
 64. Consider, for an example, the argument that we cannot ground originalism on 
original legal methods because there was no agreement about how to interpret the 
Constitution at the time of the Founding. This argument has been made both by a 
historian, Saul Cornell, and by law professors Larry Kramer and Caleb Nelson. See Saul 
Cornell, Reading the Constitution, 1787–91: History, Originalism, and Constitutional 
Meaning, 37 L. & HIST. REV. 821, 835–40 (2019); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems 
with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 912–13 (2008); Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 555–56, 561, 571–73 
(2003). 
 65. Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of 
Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 585–88 (2011). 
 66. Id. at 586. 
 67. Not surprisingly, non-originalist law professors have also attacked this approach 
to originalism. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 61; Kitrosser, supra note 61; John T. Valauri, 
Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 773 (2013). 
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Rappaport might respond that lawyers who do not agree with 
his theory of original public meaning are also wrong. They have 
the wrong theory of interpretation, and therefore their historical 
objections are equally irrelevant. But this means that his 
complaint is not really that historians lack some skill that lawyers 
possess, or that historians cannot grasp the special forms of 
reasoning of professionally trained lawyers. Rather, his objection 
is that other people—including both professionally trained 
lawyers and historians—don’t share his particular theory. 
Agreeing with a particular jurisprudential theory is not the same 
thing as possessing lawyerly skill. 
Randy Barnett has pointed out that if one adopts the New 
Originalism, much history is not especially necessary or even 
helpful to the task of interpretation. 68  That is because New 
Originalists are mostly concerned with the definitions of words 
and phrases, along with their use in legal context. “The fact that a 
legal text is old sometimes makes the identification of meaning 
more difficult, but far from impossible in most cases. For one 
thing, the meaning of language hasn’t changed that much.” 69 
Historians, Barnett suggests, are interested in “describing past 
events, . . . explaining why what happened in the past happened, 
[and] why people did what they did; as a result, they are very 
concerned with identifying motives, or other causal influences.”70 
These skills, he contends, are not particularly helpful in 
ascertaining the objective meaning of legal terms.71 
Barnett’s argument somewhat overstates the case. Historians 
are not simply or exclusively interested in motives and causal 
influences. They too, care a great deal about how people used 
words and what they meant by them.72 More to the point, they are 
interested in how people used words as rhetorical weapons, and 
 
 68. Randy Barnett, Can Lawyers Ascertain the Original Meaning of the Constitution?, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/08/19/can-
lawyers-ascertain-the-original-meaning-of-the-constitution/. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 
292–93 (2017) (noting that historians are interested in questions of motive, purpose, and 
causation, the development of ideas over time, and the discovery of archival material, 
which may not be relevant to the discovery of original public meaning). 
 72. E.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism as Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1 (2015); Cornell, supra note 64; Jonathan Gienapp, 
Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 
(2015); Rakove, supra note 48; Rakove, supra note 65. 
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how different political, religious, or social groups used the same 
words in slightly different ways. Historians are interested in the 
rough and tumble of rhetorical combat. They are interested in the 
refusal of particular combatants to employ key words and ideas in 
the same ways as their opponents. (Something, which, I should 
point out, happens even today.) 
Moreover historians, like lawyers, may be interested in how 
people deliberately used vague and equivocal language to win 
others over or deflect uncomfortable difficulties in their political 
positions. Historians care about such things because they 
recognize that the exercise of language and the exercise of social 
and cultural power are not fully distinct enterprises. The most 
important words and phrases of a particular time may have been 
a terrain of political combat in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, just as they are today. People wielded language as a 
weapon in politics then just as they do now. 
* * * 
In sum, both historians and lawyers may think that language 
works somewhat differently than Barnett describes. Therefore, 
they may disagree with his assumption that it is fairly easy to pin 
down a univocal original public meaning as to highly contested 
terms such as “executive power,” “arms” or “commerce.” Once 
again, this is not a dispute that can be resolved simply by  
noting that one is a lawyer and pointing to one’s superior legal 
expertise. Rather, it is a dispute about theories—and practices—
of interpretation to which many kinds of scholars might 
contribute. 
In any case, even if we accept Barnett’s central point— 
that much history is not needed to understand the standard 
meanings of words in common use—it only goes to the question 
of interpretation. It says nothing about construction.  
One consequence of the New Originalism’s theory of original 
meaning is that many contested questions cannot be resolved 
solely through ascertaining original meaning (in  
New Originalism’s sense of that word). Instead, people must 
resolve these controversies through constitutional construction.73 
 
 73. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28; Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 70 (2011); Solum, supra note 61. 
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Constitutional construction, in turn, requires us to use the eleven 
modalities of constitutional construction described in this article. 
When we turn to those modalities, wide swaths of history—and of 
the work of historians—are relevant and important.74 
William Baude and Stephen Sachs offer an ingenious way to 
sidestep this problem. They argue that law avoids most of the 
complications and uncertainties that professional historians find 
in the past because law uses history in only limited ways. The task 
of lawyers is to follow the law of the past, which continues as law 
until it is (lawfully) changed.75 Deciding what the law of the past 
is draws on lawyers’ legal training. Although “lawyers must often 
defer to historical expertise on the relevant questions,”76 Baude 
and Sachs explain, those relevant questions are greatly 
circumscribed, so that “the legal inquiry is a refined subset of the 
historical inquiry.”77 In particular, law “looks to legal doctrines 
and instruments specifically, rather than to intellectual 
movements more generally.” 78  The law “interprets these 
instruments in artificial ways, properly ignoring certain facts 
about their historical authors and audience. And when there is 
uncertainty, it also applies various evidentiary principles and 
default rules that can give us confidence about today’s law, even 
when yesterday’s history remains obscure.”79 
Because the focus of law is the application of old doctrines 
and old statutes, rather than the entire corpus of historical 
knowledge and intellectual history, the problem of applying old 
law in new factual settings is greatly reduced. Ordinary legal 
reasoning already involves the application of “old law to new 
facts.” 80  This means that “originalism demands no more than 
 
 74. Balkin, supra note 57, at 91–96 (describing the different ways one uses history in 
interpretation and construction). In his argument for why intellectual history is not 
relevant to the ascertainment of original public meaning, Lawrence Solum briefly 
mentions the possibility that historians’ work might be relevant to construction, especially 
if construction includes the modality of national ethos. See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual 
History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1162 (2015). I argue that history is 
relevant to all of the modalities, not just ethos. 
 75. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 L. & 
HIST. REV. 809, 812 (2019). 
 76. Id. at 810. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 810–11. 
 80. Id. at 811. 
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ordinary lawyer’s work.”81 For example, “[d]eciding whether a ‘no 
vehicles in the park’ ordinance forbids motorized wheelchairs 
differs only in degree from reviewing warrantless GPS searches 
under Founding-era trespass doctrines.” 82  Lawyers employ 
standard techniques when they apply an ancient ordinance to new 
factual situations not imagined at the time of its adoption: “We 
would need to know the legal content of the ordinance when it 
was made, the sorts of considerations that validly guided its 
application at the time, and so on. These questions are the bread-
and-butter of ordinary legal reasoning.” 83  Thus, “[w]e do not 
know what James Madison thought about video games, but we do 
know how to apply general legal concepts to facts, even when the 
concepts are very old and the facts are very new.”84 
For the same reason, lawyers need not worry too much about 
historical indeterminacy. Lawyers have the situation well in 
hand—this is what they do for a living. There may be multiple 
answers, but some answers are likely to be better than others from 
a legal perspective. “[T]oday’s lawyers are fully capable of 
rendering an opinion on which side of a Founding-era dispute had 
the better claim.”85 The reason is that these are “claims of legal 
interpretation, as are their negations; just as much the bread-and-
butter of modern judges as ‘no vehicles in the park.’”86 
Baude and Sachs seek to insulate law from historians’ 
methodological criticisms by arguing that no history gets in unless 
law says that it does. That is, Baude and Sachs argue for the 
methodological autonomy of law. Law, in this account, is a bit like 
a submarine that travels blissfully through the oceans of history, 
and only lets water in on its own terms. Otherwise, the submarine 
would sink. Put another way, law that is fully permeable to 
historical inquiry is about as useful as a screen door on a 
submarine. 
Baude and Sachs are correct that law uses history for its own 
ends. They are also correct that how lawyers think about history 
and employ history is refracted through standard forms of legal 
justification. Indeed, these are the central claims of this article. 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 818. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 818–19. 
 86. Id. at 819 (emphasis in original). 
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The difficulty is that lawyers use many different modalities of 
argument, far more than Baude and Sachs let on. These 
modalities of argument use history in ways that make it far more 
difficult to ignore historians’ work and historians’ objections. 
Because these modalities are part of legal argument, they 
continually invite history—and historical criticism—inside Baude 
and Sachs’ carefully constructed scheme of legal reason. 
Equally important, lawyers have incentives both to construct 
authority and to undermine the authority of their opponents 
through the use of history. Although Baude and Sachs claim that 
legal doctrines and legal methods tend to keep history out of legal 
argument, the incentives of legal argument work in precisely the 
opposite direction. It may well be that lawyers employ a truncated 
version of history to establish authority. But lawyers on the other 
side of a dispute may not let them get away with it. They will 
object to how history is being used as part of their legal arguments. 
Conversely, lawyers with novel claims will have incentives to 
bring new historical claims, new historical sources, and new 
methods of historical proof to lend authority. The recent 
emergence of corpus linguistics is an example of lawyers’ 
perpetual quest for ever new ways to wield history to establish 
their claims and discomfit their opponents.87 To the extent that 
historians’ criticisms are useful to lawyers who want to criticize 
other lawyers or buttress their own work, Baude and Sachs will 
not be able to keep history or historians sealed off from law. 
Baude and Sachs foreground only a few types of legal 
argument out of many. This follows from their theory of 
originalism, which asks whether today’s legal decisions have a 
traceable pedigree to the law of the past and to the doctrines of 
the past.88 Because of their distinctive theory of originalism, their 
paradigm case of legal argument is precedental argument, which 
constructs doctrines from past decisions, reasons from case to 
case, and applies existing doctrines to new facts. They also advert 
to textual arguments that apply familiar canons of construction. 
 
 87. See, e.g., Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second 
Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (August 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org
/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/ (“Applying corpus linguistics to the 
Second Amendment leads to potentially uncomfortable criticisms for both the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Heller.”). 
 88. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. L. REV. 
1455, 1457 (2019) (“[W]hatever law [enacting the Constitution] made back then remains 
the law, subject to de jure alterations or amendments made since.”). 
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These modalities of argument seem very lawyerly and isolated 
from much of historical inquiry. Baude and Sachs’ emphasis on 
these modalities gives their argument much of its rhetorical force. 
But there are plenty more arguments in constitutional law 
than are dreamt of in their philosophy. When we turn to 
arguments from purpose, structure, consequences, convention, 
custom, ethos, tradition and honored authority, it is hard to 
foreclose recourse to lots and lots of history. And not just 
adoption history—all kinds of history from different times and 
places. As soon as we focus on questions of purpose, or tradition, 
or structure, or consequences, or custom, it is hard to make a hard 
distinction between “legal doctrines and instruments” on the one 
hand, and “intellectual movements” on the other.89 
And even if we focus only on doctrinal argument, we cannot 
seal off law from history. Doctrinal arguments can have lots of 
historical tests embedded within them—for example, whether a 
group has been subject to a long history of discrimination; 90 
whether a certain right or interest is deeply rooted in our nation’s 
history and traditions;91 or whether there is historical evidence of 
a purpose or effect to promote religion.92 When forming doctrines 
and applying precedents, lawyers don’t seem to be able to resist 
gesturing to the past, and as soon as they do, historical inquiry 
seeps in. Or to vary the metaphor, the more that lawyers try to 
flee from history, the more history catches up with them. 
Take Baude and Sachs’s own example: the status of 
warrantless GPS searches under the Fourth Amendment. 93  In 
applying new technologies to old understandings, it will not be 
sufficient to parse “Founding-era trespass doctrines.”94 We will 
have to make analogies. Making analogies will require inquiries 
into—among other things—purpose, institutional history, 
structure and consequences. Making analogies will require what 
Lawrence Lessig has called “translation.”95 It will require us to 
understand the world the Framers operated in and consider how 
best to realize their purposes in a very different historical context 
 
 89. Baude & Sachs, supra note 75, at 810. 
 90. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987). 
 91. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). 
 92. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 93. Baude & Sachs, supra note 75, at 811. 
 94. Id. 
 95. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS 
READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019). 
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with different institutional and law-enforcement structures. Or in 
the words of fellow originalist Judge Robert Bork, we must 
attempt “to discern how the Framers’ values, defined in the 
context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know.”96 
As we make these inquiries, we will not be able to avoid venturing 
outside of the history of doctrine; or beyond the comfortable 
cocoon of common-law canons of construction. We will have to 
understand “the context of the world the [Framers] knew,” and 
that will invite the historians in. And even if we ourselves refuse 
to venture into broader historical inquiries, we will not be able to 
prevent the other lawyers we must argue with from venturing 
outside. 
We can put the point more generally. Lawyers use history to 
make arguments through standard forms of interpretation. They 
use history to give their arguments authority—many different 
kinds of authority, in fact. Because lawyers use history to establish 
authority, they must allow arguments about history into legal 
disputes. And because they must allow arguments about history, 
they must allow those who study and interpret history—that is, 
historians—into these disputes as well. Chief John Roberts once 
famously asserted that “history will be heard.”97 It would be quite 
odd—and perhaps even a bit hypocritical—to announce that 
history will be heard but not historians. It would be like saying 
that one is very serious about climate change but has no interest 
in hearing from any climate scientists. 
All that may be so, Baude and Sachs might respond, but the 
way that lawyers use these various modalities cuts off a great deal 
of historical evidence and historical argument. Lawyers, unlike 
historians, are simply not interested in endlessly going down 
historical rabbit holes. Lawyers, unlike historians, are not 
interested in endless disputation. They seek closure and decision. 
They seek easily tractable questions that lawyers can answer on 
their own. And once lawyers have set up the questions in ways 
that lawyers believe they can answer—for example, what is the 
best legal analogy between a GPS system and a common law 
 
 96. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1984). 
 97. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (arguing that it was important to remember that the point of 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was to outlaw “using race to assign children to 
schools”). 
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trespass?—historians, and their annoying complications, can 
(very politely) be shown the door. It was lovely talking with you 
for a brief spell, dear historians, but your services are no longer 
needed. We’ve got this! 
But of course, lawyers are interested in endlessly going down 
historical rabbit holes. And lawyers are interested in endless 
disputation. This, too, is the “bread-and-butter” 98  of ordinary 
legal practice. Baude and Sachs are surely correct that, when 
lawyers argue, they are arguing about legal claims. They are also 
correct that lawyers believe that some legal claims are more 
plausible than others, and that judges make decisions about which 
arguments are more plausible all the time. But it does not follow 
that historical inquiry is limited in the way they suggest. Quite the 
contrary, precisely because lawyers have incentives to make 
whatever arguments they believe will persuasively construct legal 
authority, they also have incentives to make whatever arguments 
they believe will persuasively undermine the legal authority of 
their opponents. Thus, if lawyers use history to establish their 
authority, other lawyers will turn to history to dispute that 
authority. In response, the first group of lawyers will return to 
history to refute the arguments of the second group, the second 
group will return to history to rebut the arguments of the first 
group, a third group will intervene to say that the first two groups 
have completely misunderstood the history, and so on. 
Some lawyers, it is true, may want to constrict historical 
inquiry and deny that historians have much to say to them. But 
other lawyers, hoping to rebut them, will happily bring the 
historians in. Historians do not even need to be invited—as I’ve 
argued previously, the modalities of argument are always 
available to them, as they are to all other citizens. Accordingly, 
we should not understand Baude and Sachs’ arguments—or those 
of Rappaport and Barnett—as actually setting the ground rules 
for legal argument. Rather, they are particular moves within legal 
argument—moves designed to structure agendas, and thereby 
make a particular set of theoretical claims and approaches seem 
more natural and plausible. 
It is worth emphasizing this point. When a group of lawyers 
say that what historians do is not relevant to law or misses the 
point of legal argument, they are not simply drawing disciplinary 
 
 98. Baude & Sachs, supra note 75, at 818. 
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boundaries between law and history. They are also attempting to 
set agendas, assert theoretical claims, and establish burdens of 
proof within legal argument. Lawyers and legal scholars who 
make these kinds of moves are not simply stiff-arming historians; 
they are also setting boundaries on how other lawyers should use 
history. By defining legal reason in this way, they seek to foreclose 
uses of history that might undermine their particular interpretive 
theories or might rebut arguments using those theories. 
Attempts to fence out historians, in other words, are often 
intra-disciplinary rather than cross-disciplinary: Lawyers who 
hope to fence out historians may also object to lawyers who would 
disagree with them about how to use history, or who would use 
history in different ways to rebut their claims to legal authority. 
Baude and Sachs’ picture of legal reason portrays a rough 
consensus among lawyers about how to make arguments and what 
sources to draw on. It is a constricted set of considerations about 
which all (or almost all) well-trained lawyers agree. In fact,  
the historical tools available to lawyers—and disagreements 
about how to use history to persuade—are much broader than 
they let on. 
Baude and Sachs hold out the hope that legal doctrines and 
canons of construction will limit disputation about history; that 
they will tell lawyers when to stop. They imagine that there is 
some constitutional law equivalent to a statute of frauds that will 
rule out of bounds large swaths of historical evidence. But—
especially in constitutional law—it is quite the opposite, as anyone 
who has ever picked up an amicus brief or a (very long) law review 
article can tell you. Fights over constitutional doctrine do not hold 
off historical dispute; they encourage lawyers to find ever new 
ways to make their cases. They make historical dispute never-
ending. 
Law claims legal authority through legal arguments. But 
lawyers do not simply stop arguing. Even when things are 
settled—which they often are—lawyers will continue to find new 
ways to keep on arguing, and they will bring history to bear to 
help them argue in new ways. And each time that lawyers bring 
history to bear, either they, or their opponents, or their 
opponents’ opponents, can and will enlist the work of historians. 
Historians cannot be kept out of legal argument because lawyers 
simply will not allow it. History is too valuable to law’s claims to 
authority to banish historians. 
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It is precisely because lawyers’ use of history is rhetorical—
employed to persuade in conditions of uncertainty—that lawyers 
cannot really escape or seal off historical inquiry. And because 
lawyers cannot escape or seal off historical inquiry, they cannot 
escape or seal off those potential participants—historians—who 
are professionally devoted to knowing something about history. 
Lawyers cannot, as Baude and Sachs hope, limit historical inquiry, 
and stop the arguments from becoming ever more about history, 
or about new ways of proving (or disproving) what history shows 
(or does not show). Even if, as Baude and Sachs correctly state, 
law’s interest in history is limited—indeed, because it is limited—
it has a hydraulic effect. Lawyers want to establish authority, and 
other lawyers want to deny them that authority. This hunger for 
authority creates incentives to turn to history to construct and 
deconstruct authority, to find ever new ways to make historical 
claims and rebut them, to find ever new archives and methods 
(such as corpus linguistics) to demonstrate and to refute historical 
claims. 
No doubt many historians will be horrified by what I have 
just said. History, they will point out, is not simply the plaything 
of adversarial legal argument. It is an inquiry into truth, even if 
the conditions of that truth are uncertain and contested. What I 
am describing is a perversion of the task of historical inquiry, a 
task transformed and corrupted by lawyers’ desire to have the last 
word in an argument for authority—a last word that, I hasten to 
add, lawyers never really can have. 
But the question on the table is not whether lawyers might 
misuse historical methods and the work of historians—I not only 
believe it, I have seen it done. Rather, the question is whether 
lawyers can find ways, internal to law, to keep historians from 
interrupting them and pointing out that their historical claims are 
anachronistic, naive, distorted, or simply wrong. The question is 
whether lawyers can successfully wield their professional identity 
and their professional norms to hold off historians’ objections. 
The question is whether they can pound the table, announce that 
they are lawyers, and tell the historians to just shut up because, 
frankly, it’s none of their business. 
My point is that lawyers cannot successfully do this, and the 
reason they cannot do this is because of their very professional 
identity as lawyers and their own professional norms. The very 
features of professionalism that cause lawyers to distort history 
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also open the door to history and historical criticism. As long as 
lawyers want to find ways of persuading others, and as long as they 
want to rebut the arguments of their fellow lawyers, they will find 
all sorts of history, and all sorts of historians, indispensable to 
their task. The relevance of history—and therefore historical 
dispute—is baked into the modalities of argument that lawyers 
unself-consciously employ. This does not make lawyers good 
historians—it only makes them perpetually subject to historians’ 
interventions. 
Baude and Sachs, like Rappaport and Barnett, are simply the 
latest in a long line of defenders of law’s methodological 
autonomy, the latest constructors of a Maginot line that hopes to 
let in only a controlled dose of history and keep the rest—and 
those pesky historians—out. The drawing of metes and bounds is 
not inappropriate by itself—it is part of what it means for a 
profession to be a profession. At the same time, for reasons 
internal to this particular profession, each attempt to 
simultaneously use history to establish legal authority and to 
exclude historical critiques from historians will fail. It will fail not 
because lawyers lack distinctive professional identities and 
professional training but because of their distinctive professional 
identities and their professional training. Because lawyers are 
lawyers, they will continually alternate between pushing away and 
embracing forms of expertise that might assist them in building up 
or chipping away at claims of legal authority. The problem is not 
that the historians won’t shut up; it is that the lawyers won’t shut 
up. Lawyers will always try to find new ways to establish the 
authority of their positions and undermine the authority of their 
competitors’ claims. Lawyers, because they are lawyers, simply 
cannot help themselves. 
VI. THE NEED FOR A USABLE PAST 
The second standard way that lawyers attempt to deflect 
criticisms from historians is to argue that lawyers, because they 
are practical people of the world, need a useable past. The 
expression “a usable past” was coined in a 1918 essay, “On 
Creating a Usable Past,” by the American literary critic Van 
Wyck Brooks.99 Brooks was one of the “Young Americans,” who 
 
 99. Van Wyck Brooks, On Creating a Usable Past, 64 DIAL 337 (1918), 
http://www.archive.org/stream/dialjournallitcrit64chicrich#page/337/mode/1up. Many 
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offered cultural criticisms of the United States in the early 
twentieth century.100 Many people have subsequently spoken of a 
“usable past” without mentioning Brooks, while uncannily 
replicating some of the themes of his essay. And of course, 
although Brooks coined the term “usable past,” the idea that 
people should deliberately use the memory of the past to inspire 
great work in the present long precedes him. To give only one 
example, this is one of the themes of Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous 
1874 essay, “On the Use and Abuse of History for the Present.”101 
Brooks’s concern was not authority in constitutional 
interpretation, but greatness in American letters. The problem, as 
Brooks saw it, was how to create a national culture in the United 
States that could inspire greatness in American writers and 
promote finer attitudes and better ideals. Unfortunately, Brooks 
believed, American culture at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was a “travesty of a civilization.”102 It was materialistic 
and stupid; it blindly worshiped wealth and technological 
progress. Professors of literature and history in universities were 
of little use. They celebrated the great deeds of America’s past, 
but only used this knowledge to shame young people rather than 
inspire them; moreover, academics were no less compromised by 
the technology-worship and materialism of the age.103 
Brooks contrasted America with Europe. Europe, he 
believed, had a past that inspired and encouraged great art. (This 
assertion is somewhat ironic, of course, given the currents of 
artistic modernism then working their way through Europe.) 
Americans lacked a cultural memory that grounded their efforts, 
situated their art, and offered an artistic tradition to work with or 
against. 
How could Americans use their past to enrich their culture? 
The answer, Brooks argued, was that Americans should invent 
 
people now associate the phrase with the work of Henry Steele Commager and Herbert 
Muller. See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE SEARCH FOR A USABLE PAST AND OTHER 
ESSAYS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY 3–27 (1967); HERBERT J. MULLER, THE USES OF THE PAST: 
PROFILES OF FORMER SOCIETIES (1967). 
 100. On the Young Americans, see CASEY NELSON BLAKE, BELOVED COMMUNITY: 
THE CULTURAL CRITICISM OF RANDOLPH BOURNE, VAN WYCK BROOKS, WALDO 
FRANK, & LEWIS MUMFORD (1990). 
 101. FRIEDERICH NIETZSCHE, On the Use and Abuse of History for the Present, in 
UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS (Daniel Breazeale ed., R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1997). 
 102. Brooks, supra note 99, at 339. 
 103. Id. at 337–38. 
BALKIN 35:3 12/29/2020 11:19 PM 
2020] LAWYERS AND HISTORIANS 385 
 
the kind of past that they could use. 104  They should draw on 
elements of the past and reinterpret them into a worthy tradition 
that could inspire them: “The past is an inexhaustible storehouse 
of apt attitudes and adaptable ideals; it opens of itself at the touch 
of desire; it yields up, now this treasure, now that, to anyone who 
comes to it armed with a capacity for personal choices.”105 
In Brooks’ account, a usable past is a selective history; it does 
not revel in needless complications or complexities. It does not 
require a comprehensive record of history. It wants just enough 
history to do its job—which is to inspire the present. Nor is a 
usable past a foreign country or an alien realm. Advocates of a 
usable past are not interested in the inherent pastness of the past, 
but in its organic relationship to the present. A usable past is a 
past that is connected to us, not separated from us. A usable past 
is a past that we can understand and relate to, a past that is not 
hopelessly different from our own world. Above all, a usable past 
is a resource that people in the present can deploy selectively to 
support and inspire fellow citizens to great deeds and great works 
of art. Brooks uses the metaphor of a “storehouse” of objects that 
one might choose from, while leaving the others behind. The 
riches of this storehouse emerge from “desire” and “personal 
choice.” It contains “apt” features that we can take with us to the 
present, and ideals that are “adaptable” to our needs. And above 
all the storehouse is valuable to us because it can revitalize and 
motivate the present and spur great cultural achievements. 
Brooks’ fellow Young American, Lewis Mumford, 
emphasized that a usable past gave meaning to our endeavors by 
connecting us to the past. A culture needs continuity with the past 
to ground itself and give itself direction. Because America lacked 
a usable past, Mumford believed, it was prey to the social forces 
of the present, including social disconnection and unchecked 
materialism: “Establishing its own special relations with its past, 
each generation creates anew what lies behind it, as well as what 
looms in front; and instead of being victimized by those forces 
 
 104. Id. at 339 (“[T]he American writer floats in [a] void because the past that survives 
in the common mind of the present is a past without living value. But is this the only 
possible past? If we need another past so badly, is it inconceivable that we might discover 
one, that we might even invent one? Discover, invent a usable past we certainly can, and 
that is what a vital criticism always does.”). 
 105. Id.; see also id. at 340 (“What is important for us? What, out of all the multifarious 
achievements and impulses and desires of the American literary mind, ought we elect to 
remember?”). 
BALKIN 35:3 12/29/2020 11:19 PM 
386 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.35:345 
 
which are uppermost at the moment, it gains the ability to select 
the qualities which it values, and by exercising them it rectifies its 
own infirmities and weaknesses.”106 
A usable past is a form of cultural memory and tradition, and 
Brooks viewed cultural memory and tradition as constructed, 
either by accident or by design. Cultural memory is made up of 
what people in a society choose to remember about their past. 
Tradition is made up out of what they choose to honor. Brooks 
pointed out, for example, that other nations found plenty of things 
in the American experience to celebrate—and each nation found 
different things to admire because they saw things in America that 
resonated or contrasted with the cultural memory and traditions 
of their own countries.107 
It followed then, that Americans should create their own 
memories and traditions that could inspire them by mining the 
storehouse of the past to find what was useful for the present, and 
to elevate it even if it had not been previously been deemed 
important. To this end, Brooks argued against focusing on the 
relatively small number of celebrated American authors and 
acknowledged masterpieces of American literature.108 Instead, to 
create a useable past Americans should focus on the strivings of 
eccentrics and failures—now mostly forgotten—whose creativity 
and genius had been unfairly stunted by the national culture that 
surrounded them. Inspiration for great work in the future would 
come from rediscovering and elevating this “limbo of the non-
elect.”109 American artists should select from the past according 
to their values, and find their heroes, even among the forgotten 
and cast-off elements of history. 
Some eighty years later, in 1995, the American legal scholar 
Cass Sunstein wrote a short essay in the Columbia Law Review 
entitled “The Idea of a Usable Past.”110 His goal was to explain 
why constitutional lawyers could and should use history 
differently than professional historians. He offered virtually all of 
the standard arguments that lawyers make in their defense, and 
his article remains the best and most sustained argument for a 
 
 106. BLAKE, supra note 100, at 296–97 (quoting Lewis Mumford, The Emergence of a 
Past, 45 NEW REPUBLIC 19 (1925)). 
 107. Brooks, supra note 99, at 339–40. 
 108. Id. at 341. 
 109. Id. at 340. 
 110. Sunstein, supra note 23. 
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“usable past” in the law review literature. Although Sunstein did 
not mention Brooks, his account has striking similarities. 
Sunstein wrote to respond to criticisms—by both lawyers and 
historians—directed at the “republican revival” in American legal 
scholarship in the 1980s. Almost contemporaneous with the 
promotion of conservative originalism by the Reagan 
Administration and the Federalist Society, liberal academics like 
Sunstein and Frank Michelman had begun to offer a left-liberal 
version of originalism, grounding a progressive constitutionalism 
in a distinctive account of the Founding. 111  They drew on 
historical work by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J. G. A. 
Pocock, among others.112 
Sunstein and Michelman argued that the true tradition of 
American constitutionalism was not exclusively Lockean liberal 
individualism, which generations of scholars had used to justify a 
focus on individual rights and interest group pluralism. Rather, 
the Founding generation was also steeped in the ideology of civic 
republicanism, which emphasized civic virtue, social connection, 
deliberative democracy, and the common good. By forgetting 
these traditions of civic republicanism, American legal scholars 
had cut themselves off from their own history, and adopted a false 
narrative that legitimated a politics of selfishness and self-interest. 
The republican revival, as it was called, generated rebuttals 
from historians and from legal scholars who specialized in 
Founding-era history. Critics charged that neo-republicans were 
engaged in a more sophisticated version of the law-office history 
of conservative originalists. As Laura Kalman put it, the neo-
republicans rummaged through the past “to find arguments for 
whatever vision of the social order they wished to promote. By 
 
 111. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); 
Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 
(1985). Civic republican themes were also combined with feminism and critical legal 
studies. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). 
 112. See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE 
REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S (1984); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE 
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC 
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776–87 (1969). 
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mooring their vision in the Founding, law professors believed they 
could make a more powerful case for it. They could claim kinship 
with the Founders.”113 
To be sure, there were a few differences between the neo-
republicans and conservative originalists. First, most professional 
historians, who were liberals themselves, tended to sympathize 
with the political project of the neo-republicans. Second, the neo-
republicans drew on a wider range of sources and secondary 
literature than conservative originalists, including the work of the 
most distinguished professional historians. “[T]he civic 
republicans,” Mark Festa explained, “sought to invoke the 
authority not just of historical evidence itself, but also of the 
professional expertise of the historians who interpreted it.”114 
But these differences hardly absolved the liberal law 
professors in the eyes of professional historians. If anything, they 
made historians uneasy. It was one thing to see conservatives 
quoting Blackstone or The Federalist anachronistically and out of 
context. It was quite another to see the best historical scholarship 
deployed in this way.115 
Historians like Gordon Wood and Joyce Appleby pointed 
out that neo-republicans could not find the historical pedigree 
they sought by appealing to the ideology of civic republicanism.116 
Linda Kerber noted that the civic republicanism of the Founders 
was not easy to separate from militarism, patriarchy and 
oligarchy, and that it was anachronistic to try to separate them.117 
Law professors, who are often the sternest critics of other law 
professors doing history, were more blunt. Mark Tushnet worried 
that the ideology of eighteenth century civic republicanism 
“unravels once we attempt to disentangle the currently attractive 
strands from the currently unattractive ones.” 118  H. Jefferson 
Powell argued that there was little connection between Sunstein’s 
political ideals and “specific schools of thought in the founding 
 
 113. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 175 (1996). 
 114. Festa, supra note 7, at 495–96. 
 115. Id. 
 116. KALMAN, supra note 113, at 175–76 (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC viii (1969)).  
 117. Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1667–69 
(1988). 
 118. Mark Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition in Constitutional Historiography, 29 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 96 (1987); see also Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional 
Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81–82 (1987). 
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era.”119 Barry Friedman argued that “[t]he very same problems 
that haunt originalism also haunt republicanism.” 120  Martin 
Flaherty dubbed the republican revival “History Lite.”121 
In response, Sunstein defended his use of civic republicanism 
on the grounds that constitutional lawyers need a usable past, 
which he defined as “finding elements in history that can be 
brought fruitfully to bear on current problems.” 122  In fact, 
Sunstein, argued “[t]he search for a useable past is a defining 
feature of the constitutional lawyer’s approach to constitutional 
history.”123 
Invoking Ronald Dworkin’s idea of constructive 
interpretation, which tries to make the materials of the law “the 
best they can be,” 124  Sunstein asserted that “constitutional 
lawyers, unlike ordinary historians, should attempt to make the 
best constructive sense out of historical events associated with the 
Constitution.” 125  Consistent with the “fit” of historical facts, 
lawyers should “try to conceive of the materials in a way that 
makes political or moral sense, rather than nonsense, out of them 
to current generations.”126 Obviously this meant viewing history 
in the light of the present-day lawyer’s moral and political 
judgments. “Everyone can see that the political or moral 
commitments of the constitutional lawyer are an omnipresent part 
of the constitutional lawyer’s constitutional history.” But this is 
not an embarrassment. “Political or moral commitments play a 
role because of the interpretive nature of the lawyer’s enterprise, 
which involves showing how the history might be put to present 
use.”127 
Sunstein denied that there was anything illegitimate about 
“identify[ing] those features of the constitutional past” that a 
 
 119. H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1706, 1711 
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 122. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603; cf. Brooks, supra note 99, at 340 (“Only by the 
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 123. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603. 
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 125. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 602 (emphasis in original). 
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 127. Id. at 603. 
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lawyer views as “especially suitable for present constitutional 
use.”128 “Constitutional law is based on ideas about authority, not 
just on ideas about the good or the right.”129 And “[t]he American 
constitutional culture gives special weight to the conventions of 
those who ratified constitutional provisions.”130 
Sunstein’s model of a useable past was primarily concerned 
with adoption history. But not all of adoption history—much less 
all of American history—can form part of a useable past, Sunstein 
explained. “[M]uch in our constitutional history is bad and no 
longer usable.”131 For example, the Founders accepted slavery, a 
“much narrower” conception of freedom of speech “than anyone 
would find reasonable today,” and “the Framers’ conception of 
equality would permit forms of discrimination that the Supreme 
Court would unanimously condemn” today.132 Sunstein did not 
deny that these events happened. His point was that they were not 
useful to constitutional lawyers who sought to create a useable 
past: “[a]spects of constitutional history that are of considerable 
importance to constitutional historians may not be so useful for 
constitutional lawyers.”133 
“[T]he constitutional lawyer, thinking about the future 
course of constitutional law, has a special project” that 
distinguishes her from the professional historian. 134  The 
professional historian is “subject to the discipline provided by the 
sources and by the interpretive conventions in the relevant 
communities of historians.”135 But “the constitutional lawyer is 
trying to contribute to the legal culture’s repertoire of arguments 
and political/legal narratives that place a (stylized) past and 
present into a trajectory leading to a desired future.” 136  The 
professional historian may have her eyes on the past, but the 
constitutional lawyer has her eyes on the future. She wants to 
forge a rhetorical connection between the admirable features of 
the Founders’ vision and the political world she would like to 
bring into being. Because the Founders are central to our 
 
 128. Id. at 604. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 605. 
 133. Id. at 604–05. 
 134. Id. at 605. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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constitutional heritage, they can encourage, authorize, and inspire 
our efforts in the present. 
Two features make the past usable. First, the past 
“discipline[es] legal judgment.” It bounds utopian speculation 
and connects legal argument to the American constitutional 
tradition. It requires lawyers to argue in terms of materials that 
have “at least some kind of democratic pedigree” because they 
were adopted by We the People.137 
Second, and equally important, what makes the past usable 
is that it is normatively admirable by today’s standards. 
Conversely, what is not normatively acceptable is not usable. As 
Sunstein put it, “much in our constitutional history is bad and no 
longer usable.”138 Again contrasting the interests of lawyers to 
those of historians, he explained, “[p]erhaps the historian wants 
to reveal the closest thing to a full picture of the past, or to stress 
the worst aspects of a culture’s legal tradition,” but “constitutional 
history as set out by the constitutional lawyer, as a participant in 
the constitutional culture, usually tries to put things in a favorable 
or appealing light without, however, distorting what can actually 
be found.”139 
Sunstein believed that the civic republican tradition offered 
an excellent example of how present-day lawyers could interpret 
the past constructively—that is, admirably—by abstracting away 
its normatively unacceptable features. The tradition of civic 
republicanism was built on social hierarchy. Male citizens could 
be devoted to the public good because they were heads of 
households. They were supported by women and (sometimes) 
slaves, who were regarded as properly subordinate to a 
community of equal male citizens. Civic duty was connected 
obligations of militia service, including the willingness to fight and 
die for the republic; thus, the idea of civic virtue had overtones of 
militarism and manly virtue. 
Sunstein was perfectly aware of all this but argued that it did 
not matter. The republican tradition, “in some of its 
incarnations,” was “associated with unappealing and unusable 
ideas—exclusion of women, militarism, lack of respect for 
 
 137. Id. at 604. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 603. 
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competing conceptions of the good, and more.”140 (Note, once 
again, that what makes these ideas “unusable” is that they are 
wrong by today’s standards.) “But the commitment to 
deliberative democracy is not logically connected with those 
unappealing ideals; indeed, as an abstraction it is in considerable 
tension with them.”141 Abstracting away the unjust elements of a 
tradition is acceptable, Sunstein argued, and may even be 
necessary to render it usable to the present. “Constitutional 
lawyers who are interested in republicanism need not be 
embarrassed by its contingent historical connection with unjust 
practices.”142 
Despite the disciplinary differences between law and 
literature, Sunstein’s account of a usable past is remarkably 
similar to Brooks’ version in 1918. Americans need inspiration to 
achieve great things, whether in politics, law or in letters. To do 
that they need a past that is useful for this purpose. Academic 
historians, with their eyes fixed on the past, reined in by their own 
professional norms, are often mired in antiquarian projects, and 
can offer only limited assistance. Academic historians are far 
more likely to complicate than to elucidate, to depress and 
confuse their audiences than to inspire them to great things. 
American lawyers, like American literary critics, understand that 
the point of the past is to serve the future. Accordingly, they need 
to reach into the storehouse of history, construct inspiring 
narratives, and create a past worthy of instruction to the present. 
Just as Mumford believed that establishing connections with 
history could help us from being “victimized by those forces which 
are uppermost at the moment,”143 Sunstein argued that retelling 
the story of civic republicanism could help constitutional lawyers 
combat the selfishness of 1980s politics. In this way progressive 
lawyers could counter the neo-liberal agenda of the Reagan 
years—itself defended in originalist terms—with a 
communitarian vision drawn from the Founding. 
In terms of the modalities of historical argument described in 
Part II of this article, it is easy to see that Sunstein’s version of a 
usable past is an appeal to ethos, tradition, and honored authority. 
 
 140. Id. at 606. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. BLAKE, supra note 100, at 297 (quoting Lewis Mumford, The Emergence of a 
Past, 45 NEW REPUBLIC 19 (1925)). 
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His arguments about civic republicanism appeal to the same 
modalities of ethos, tradition and honored authority as many 
conservative originalist arguments do—either implicitly or 
explicitly.144 That is why, I suspect, professional historians may 
have reacted in the way that they did. 
Sunstein, however, was insistent that he was not 
countenancing bad history, much less advocating sloppiness: “[I]t 
is familiar to find a constitutional lawyer reading history at a very 
high level of abstraction (“the Framers were committed to 
freedom of speech”) and concluding that some concrete outcome 
follows for us (“laws regulating obscenity are unconstitutional.”) 
This use of history is not honorable.”145 The problem for Sunstein 
was that pointing to the level of abstraction did not really 
distinguish how he wanted to use history from the kind of 
historical arguments he did not respect. To create his version of a 
usable past, Sunstein also wanted to read history at a fairly high 
level of abstraction; and, as we have seen, he believed that one 
could abstract away the unpalatable parts of the civic republican 
tradition. 
“The Framers,” Sunstein explained, “were republicans. . . . 
[T]hey prized civic virtue and sought to promote deliberation in 
government—deliberation oriented toward rights answers about 
the collective good.”146 Sunstein sought to apply these abstract 
propositions to modern First Amendment law and other doctrinal 
areas. His 1993 book Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 
for example, was premised on a “Madisonian” conception of free 
speech which purportedly reflected the Founding-era ideals of 
deliberative democracy. 147  Reviewing Sunstein’s book, I joked 
that “Sunstein’s ‘Madisonian’ theory of the First Amendment is 
about as Madisonian as Madison, Wisconsin: It is a tribute to a 
great man and his achievements, but bears only a limited 
connection to his actual views.”148 
 
 144. See Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 652, 682–96 (arguing that 
originalist arguments involve multiple modalities and usually implicitly or explicitly appeal 
to ethos, tradition, and honored authority). 
 145. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603. 
 146. Id. at 605. 
 147. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xvi–
xviii, 132–33, 241–44 (1993). 
 148. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1935, 1955 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF FREE SPEECH (1993)). 
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What distinguishes good from bad uses of history, however, 
is not the level of abstraction. It is whether we acknowledge or 
disguise our modality of argument. Bad uses of history mislead 
their audiences about the kinds of justification they actually 
employ. For example, they might assert that they are only 
concerned with discerning the historical facts of meaning, purpose 
or intention when they are actually appealing to (and 
reconstructing) ethos and tradition, using the Framers and the 
Founding generation as culture heroes.149 Perhaps what Sunstein 
should have said was that while those who misused history refused 
to admit this, he would do so forthrightly. He was acting as what 
I call a “memory entrepreneur,” seeking to construct inspiring 
narratives of the past to articulate a desirable conception of 
American values in the present.150 
In hindsight, then, it would probably have been better for 
Sunstein to avoid making his first amendment theory sound like 
conservative originalism, much less to assert that his theory of 
freedom of speech was Madison’s theory, or that it had “firm 
support” from Founding-era history.151 Instead, he might simply 
have emphasized that, like Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. 
California, he was making an argument about national ethos.152 
The American tradition of freedom of expression, understood in 
its best light, and symbolized by Madison, the First Amendment’s 
author, is a tradition that celebrates reason and deliberation to 
make democracy work. Put in terms of Sunstein’s arguments 
about a useful past, he was “contribut[ing] to the legal culture’s 
repertoire of arguments and political/legal narratives that place a 
(stylized) past and present into a trajectory leading to a desired 
future.”153 This might have robbed his arguments of the historical 
pedigree that originalist scholars sometimes like to claim for 
themselves. But it would have offered a more appropriate use of 
history. 
Sunstein’s account of a usable past is quite common among 
 
 149. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 641, 652, 682–96. 
 150. Id. at 696. 
 151. SUNSTEIN, supra note 147, at 132. 
 152. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373–74 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (1927) 
(“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to  
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative  
forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”); Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 
676–77.  
 153. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 605. 
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American constitutional lawyers, even if they have not always 
expressed their aims so coherently and candidly. 154  American 
lawyers are not interested in antiquarianism for its own sake. 
They want to draw lessons, advice, and even commands from 
history. To this end, they seek a past that can justify 
interpretations of the Constitution in the present. They look for 
those features of the American constitutional tradition that, given 
their political and theoretical commitments, deserve to be 
continued and followed today. This is an example of what I earlier 
called an obedient use of history. We might call this model of a 
usable past the model of admirable ancestors. By the standards of 
this model only some history is usable. The rest is not. 
Understood as a justification for making arguments from 
ethos, tradition, and honored authority—the model of admirable 
ancestors is a perfectly legitimate use of history. Legitimate, that 
is, if it does not try to conceal its nature to its audience. 
Nevertheless, as a general account of a usable past for 
constitutional argument, this model has very significant 
limitations. 
First, the model of admirable ancestors is usually concerned 
with adoption history, and especially the history of the Founding. 
All other history of the nation, and indeed, of the world, is, by 
implication, not usable for these purposes. Similarly, it is a history 
of persons and groups who successfully managed to change the 
text of the Constitution or to influence those who did. Thus, 
Locke and Blackstone are part of a usable past because the 
adopters read them and were influenced by them. The Anti-
Federalists are part of a usable past because their objections to 
 
 154. For example, Alexander Bickel anticipates many of Sunstein’s arguments. See, 
e.g., BICKEL, supra note 25, at 109 (quoting Herbert Muller for the view that “[o]ur task is 
to create a ‘usable past,’ for our own living purposes”); id. (quoting Jacob Burckhardt for 
the view that history “is on every occasion the record of what one age finds worthy of note 
in another”); id. (“We are guided in our search of the past by our own aspirations and 
evolving principles, which were in part formed by that very past.”); id. at 109–10 (arguing 
that “[w]hen we find in history . . . principles that we can adopt or adapt, or ideals and 
aspirations that speak with contemporary relevance,” we should focus on “the rhetorical 
tradition and its implications, not the inconsistent commitment.”). 
Like me, Howard Vogel connects the idea of a usable past in constitutional law to the 
forms of argument. See Howard J. Vogel, The “Ordered Liberty” of Substantive Due 
Process and the Future of Constitutional Law as a Rhetorical Art: Variations on a Theme 
from Justice Cardozo in the United States Supreme Court, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1473, 1545–52 
(2007) (“[L]egal argument is always, in various ways, a search for a ‘usable past’ in light of 
the need to resolve disputes in the present”). 
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the proposed Constitution forced its advocates to modify their 
claims about how the Constitution would operate in practice, and 
to support new amendments to the Constitution, some of which 
appeared in the Bill of Rights. Likewise, the views of nineteenth-
century abolitionists are part of a usable past because their 
opposition to slavery eventually carried the day in the 
Reconstruction Amendments. In sum, this account of a usable 
past focuses on the history of those who won struggles for 
constitutional adoption—or influenced those who won—as 
opposed to those whose claims were ignored or crushed; or those 
who, like women before the adoption of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, were given no voice in governance.155 (We might 
contrast this model of a usable past to that of Van Wyck Brooks, 
who sought to construct a tradition from those who lost so badly 
that they are not even remembered.) Selecting only the winners’ 
perspectives discards a great deal of history as not usable. 
Second, what makes the past usable in this model is that it is 
normatively admirable by today’s standards—or at the very least 
acceptable and inoffensive. (More precisely, it is admirable in the 
eyes of the particular person making the historical argument.) 
Conversely, what is not normatively admirable or acceptable is 
not usable; therefore it must be omitted, distinguished, or 
separated from the honorable and usable parts of history. 
History is usable in this model because it teaches us 
something important about the past that we should follow in the 
present. We might follow it because it provides an authoritative 
construction of features of the Constitution, its purposes, text, and 
structure. Or we might follow it because it offers us models for 
appropriate behavior or principles for present-day law and 
politics. But in either case, a usable past gives us guidance about 
what to do today, either through instruction or inspiration. Thus, 
in terms of Part III’s typology, the model of admirable ancestors 
is both an obedient and an authority-constructing use of history.156 
Nevertheless, this conception of a usable past throws away a 
great deal of history; and it discards many possible ways of using 
a complex tradition in the present.157 History that shows that our 
 
 155. Siegel, supra note 40. 
 156. See supra Part III. 
 157. See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 
2153 (1999) (“Sunstein does not come to grips with the reality that all of American history 
is potentially relevant to his project.”). 
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constitutional traditions are not worthy, admirable, or inspiring is 
not usable. History that shows how application of past practices 
to present-day circumstances is inevitably anachronistic is not 
usable. History that complicates—that denies that we have 
inherited a coherent or unitary tradition—is not usable. Similarly, 
history that shows that there was not a clear, definitive answer to 
how the Constitution was understood at the time of adoption, is 
not usable. Critical accounts of history, which show how our 
present traditions, values, and arrangements are inextricably 
bound up with past errors and injustices, are not usable. 
Historicist accounts, which show how features of the 
constitutional tradition—and our understanding of those 
features—have not been constant or enduring but have altered 
with changing times, are not usable. 
The irony of this model of a usable past is that it renders so 
much history unusable. 
It is a bit like a man who enters a huge room with a vast 
variety of fresh ingredients, meats, fruits, vegetables, condiments 
and spices before him. He then proceeds to throw away almost 
everything in the room and make a grilled-cheese sandwich. He 
defends his wastefulness on the grounds that he is not a 
professional chef—he is a special kind of short-order cook. From 
his perspective, all of the other food in the room is simply 
unusable. And besides, he explains earnestly, the customers won’t 
swallow anything else. 
I myself have nothing against a really good grilled-cheese 
sandwich. But surely there is more nourishment to be found in 
history. 
For history to be usable, it does not have to offer a clear 
command to the present. It does not have to be honorable or 
inspiring. The past is a motley arrangement of good and bad, just 
and unjust, often inextricably bound together. Negative 
precedents may be more valuable to us than hero worship. 
Knowing how the nation went wrong may be more useful than 
hearing yet again how splendidly our predecessors got things 
right. History may edify even if it does not inspire. 
This point holds true even if we limit ourselves to arguments 
from ethos and tradition. In 1995, Sunstein hoped to abstract the 
tradition of civic republicanism from its unpalatable historical 
elements. These unjust elements, he thought, were merely 
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“contingent.” 158  But what if they were not? Suppose that the 
social hierarchy of the eighteenth century helped make civic 
republicanism possible? Then it would be partly constitutive of 
the tradition and not merely contingent. If we want to follow that 
tradition today, we may have to take the bitter with the sweet. Or 
we may have to change the tradition significantly, in which case 
we are not following it so much as transforming it. 
Political traditions are entangled in complex social relations 
and historical contexts. Transporting these values from the past 
may bring other less admirable features and complications along 
with them. If we assume that we can easily cleanse these traditions 
of their less troublesome elements, we may miss some of the most 
important lessons of the past for the present. Working within a 
tradition, no matter how hallowed, may involve moral 
compromises. There are no traditions without tradeoffs. 
Instead of trying to abstract away the problems of past 
traditions, it may be more appropriate to acknowledge their 
difficulties and complications. The past may be more usable if we 
do not treat our traditions as unequivocally admirable; it will 
simply be usable in a different way. 159  History has many uses 
besides imitation, obedience, or encouragement. It may edify, 
enlighten or admonish us. We might use the past to make the 
present strange to us, thereby loosening us from our accustomed 
habits of thinking, and our constant tendency to accept the world 
before us as just and natural; or, conversely, as incorrigible and 
impossible to reform. 
History may reveal problems never solved and injustices 
never corrected whose consequences haunt us today. It may show 
the residue of ancient wrongs in a modern world. It may remind us 
not to paper over past difficulties with the banner of a glorious and 
unitary tradition. History might suggest alternatives to our present 
arrangements, or offer warnings about disasters we should avoid. 
Instead of directing our course of action, it may clarify our choices. 
Instead of urging us to imitate our ancestors, it may remind us how 
much our actions must be our own responsibility. 
 
 158. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 606. 
 159. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman’s 
“Strange Career” and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1084 
(1998) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 
(1996)) (arguing for employing the civic republican tradition in all its interpretive 
complexity and normative ambiguity). 
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VII. CONCLUSION: ADMIRABLE ANCESTORS OR 
MULTIPLE MODALITIES 
To imagine a better model of a usable past for constitutional 
lawyers, begin with a different set of questions: What do lawyers 
want from the past, and what makes it useful to them? By this 
point in the Article, the answer should be obvious. Lawyers want 
to use the past to help them make arguments that (1) successfully 
claim legal authority and (2) rebut claims to authority offered by 
their opponents. 
It follows that a usable past might include any part of the past 
that might assist lawyers in the construction or the deconstruction 
of legal authority. The past is potentially usable whenever it 
assists lawyers in making or rebutting arguments according to the 
eleven modalities of constitutional argument. We might call this 
conception of a usable past the model of multiple modalities. 
The model of admirable ancestors is only a special case of this 
model because it limits itself to certain arguments from ethos, 
tradition, and honored authority. The model of multiple 
modalities encompasses all of the history relevant to the model of 
admirable ancestors. But it includes far more history, and values 
it for a much wider range of purposes. 
To be sure, this account of a usable past is still selective. Not 
every part of the past is equally useful to the modalities of legal 
argument, even considered collectively. The model of multiple 
modalities is not a neutral or dispassionate inquiry into history, 
because of the close connections between usable history and 
theories of legal justification. Above all, this model of a usable 
past is shaped by lawyers’ concerns. It is an adversarial conception 
of history shaped by the needs of the legal profession—the need 
to create new arguments for new situations and to rebut the 
arguments of one’s opponents. It differs from how other parts of 
the humanities and social sciences may think of the past; and 
historians may still criticize how lawyers use history for this 
reason. 
Nevertheless, this conception of a usable past has definite 
advantages over the model of admirable ancestors. 
First, it employs a far broader set of historical materials than 
adoption history. It ranges over the whole of American history, 
and indeed, the history of the world. 
Second, it is not limited to appeals to ethos, tradition, and 
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honored authority. History may be useful to assess consequences, 
to understand the structures of a well-functioning government, 
and to reckon with the meaning of events quite distant from the 
Founding. 
Third, this model does not require that history be admirable, 
uncomplicated, or univocal in order to be useful, especially when 
the advocate’s task is criticism or rebuttal. It does not rule out 
complexity or shun a critical approach. It does not require that 
history be inspiring or that we must always place our traditions in 
their best light. And it does not assume that in searching for a 
usable past, we may excise what is unjust or uncomfortable, 
especially if we can learn from it. 
Finally, the model of multiple modalities is a better account 
of a usable past because it better integrates the contributions of 
historians. It does not assume that professional historians cannot 
usefully critique lawyers’ history because lawyers inhabit different 
professional roles and are engaged in different intellectual 
projects. 
I have no quarrel with the notion of a usable past. But 
constitutional lawyers have not taken the idea seriously enough—
or considered all of its ramifications. Even if we restrict ourselves 
to the lawyer’s obsessive focus on constructing and deconstructing 
legal authority, there are many ways to use history; and many 
different kinds of history, from all times and places, that one might 
employ. Critical uses of history, which show the limits and failings 
of the past, may be every bit as useful as heroic accounts. 
Complicating uses of history, which reveal dissensus, ambiguity 
and contingency, may be as important to understanding the 
present as stylized accounts that seek a single, univocal, lesson or 
command. 
If we want a usable past, we should not be wasteful. We 
should be willing to use as much of the past as possible, and for as 
many purposes as we can. If we are economical with history, and 
remember the multiple ways to employ and learn from it, it will 
provide us with all the riches we could desire. 
 
